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Opposition To Contract Production: Self-Selection, Status, And Stranded Assets

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  • Skully, David W.

Abstract

Production contract tournaments induce self-selection among producers. Self-selection for pork differs from broiler production resulting in a predictably different political response by incumbent producers to contract innovation. The higher capital and status of incumbent pork producers than poultry producers account for much of the difference.

Suggested Citation

  • Skully, David W., 1998. "Opposition To Contract Production: Self-Selection, Status, And Stranded Assets," 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT 21012, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea98:21012
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21012
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hubbell, Bryan J., 1997. "Entropy Based Measurement Of Geographic Concentration In U.S. Hog Production," Faculty Series 16722, University of Georgia, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    2. Nelson, Robert G. & Turner, Steven C., 1995. "Experimental Examination Of A Thin Market: Price Behavior In A Declining Terminal Market Revisited," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 27(01), pages 1-12, July.
    3. repec:cup:jagaec:v:29:y:1997:i:02:p:267-278_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:cup:jagaec:v:27:y:1995:i:01:p:149-160_01 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Knoeber, Charles R & Thurman, Walter N, 1994. "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 155-179, April.
    6. Martin, Laura L., 1997. "Production Contracts, Risk Shifting, And Relative Performance Payments In The Pork Industry," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(2), pages 1-12, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. C. Hinrichs & Rick Welsh, 2003. "The effects of the industrialization of US livestock agriculture on promoting sustainable production practices," Agriculture and Human Values, Springer;The Agriculture, Food, & Human Values Society (AFHVS), vol. 20(2), pages 125-141, June.
    2. Worley, C. Thomas & McCluskey, Jill J., 2000. "Production Contracts As A Means Of Vertical Coordination With Application To The Wheat Industry," Journal of Food Distribution Research, Food Distribution Research Society, vol. 31(01), pages 1-10, March.

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