Export Subsidies And Switching Costs In An Imperfectly Competitive International Wheat Market
Switching costs affect importer decisions, hence impacts of subsidies over time. Dynamic, game theoretic simulations of EU-US competition for Moroccan wheat imports suggest firms charge lower prices and governments award higher subsidies with switching costs. Policy under alternative institutional arrangements depends on the extent of switching costs, measured here econometrically.
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