Setting Monetary Policy in East Asia: Goals, Developments and Institutions
In: Future Directions for Monetary Policies in East Asia
This paper presents a comprehensive and analytical review of monetary policy-making in the East Asian economies since the 1997 financial crisis. Focusing on the three key issues of objectives, instruments and institutional developments, it surveys the recent choice of monetary policy objectives in East Asia. The paper observes that while most central banks in East Asia are striving for price stability, the openness of their economies compels them to focus on exchange rate. Their strategies, however, vary from using effective exchange rate as an operating target, to adoption of inflation targeting and fixed exchange rate with selective capital controls. On central bank independence, the paper concludes that there is very little support for several propositions linking central bank independence with inflation; and that more attention should be given to the balance-sheet independence of central banks.
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|This chapter was published in: David Gruen & John Simon (ed.) Future Directions for Monetary Policies in East Asia, Reserve Bank of Australia, pages , 2001.|
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References listed on IDEAS
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