IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pth207.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Caroline D. Thomas

Personal Details

First Name:Caroline
Middle Name:D.
Last Name:Thomas
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pth207
https://sites.google.com/site/carotho14/
Terminal Degree:2011 Department of Economics; University College London (UCL) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Texas-Austin

Austin, Texas (United States)
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/economics/
RePEc:edi:deutxus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Thomas, Caroline, 2018. "The culture of overconfidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 12740, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Thomas, Caroline, 2017. "The Design of Credit Information Systems," CEPR Discussion Papers 11849, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Caroline D. Thomas, 2010. "Strategic Experimentation with Congestion," Department of Economics Working Papers 130813, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2013.
  4. Caroline D. Thomas, 2009. "N-Dimensional Blotto Game with Asymmetric Battlefield Values," Department of Economics Working Papers 130116, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2016.
  5. Caroline D. Thomas & Martin W. Cripps, "undated". "Strategic Experimentation in Queues," Department of Economics Working Papers 140228, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2016.
  6. Caroline D. Thomas, "undated". "Career Concerns and Policy Intransigence - A Dynamic Signalling Model," Department of Economics Working Papers 161228, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2016.

Articles

  1. Caroline D. Thomas, 2021. "Strategic Experimentation with Congestion," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 1-82, February.
  2. Thomas, Caroline, 2020. "Stopping with congestion and private payoffs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 18-42.
  3. Krainin, Colin & Thomas, Caroline & Wiseman, Thomas, 2020. "Rational Quagmires: Attrition, Learning, and War," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 15(3), pages 369-400, July.
  4. V. Bhaskar & Caroline Thomas, 2019. "The Culture of Overconfidence," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 95-110, June.
  5. V Bhaskar & Caroline Thomas, 2019. "Community Enforcement of Trust with Bounded Memory," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 86(3), pages 1010-1032.
  6. Cripps, Martin W. & Thomas, Caroline D., 2019. "Strategic experimentation in queues," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
  7. Thomas, Caroline, 2019. "Experimentation with reputation concerns – Dynamic signalling with changing types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 366-415.
  8. Caroline Thomas, 2018. "N-dimensional Blotto game with heterogeneous battlefield values," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(3), pages 509-544, May.
  9. Balázs Szentes & Caroline D. Thomas, 2013. "An Evolutionary Theory of Suicide," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-11, August.
  10. Guéron, Yves & Lamadon, Thibaut & Thomas, Caroline D., 2011. "On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 287-295, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Thomas, Caroline, 2018. "The culture of overconfidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 12740, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Danz, David, 2020. "Never underestimate your opponent: Hindsight bias causes overplacement and overentry into competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 588-603.
    2. Thomas, Caroline, 2019. "Experimentation with reputation concerns – Dynamic signalling with changing types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 366-415.

  2. Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Thomas, Caroline, 2017. "The Design of Credit Information Systems," CEPR Discussion Papers 11849, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Sergey Kovbasyuk & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021. "Memory And Markets," Working Papers w0284, New Economic School (NES).

  3. Caroline D. Thomas, 2010. "Strategic Experimentation with Congestion," Department of Economics Working Papers 130813, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2013.

    Cited by:

    1. Atal, Vidya & Bar, Talia & Gordon, Sidartha, 2016. "Project selection: Commitment and competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 30-48.
    2. Caroline D. Thomas, 2021. "Strategic Experimentation with Congestion," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 1-82, February.
    3. Heidhues, Paul & Rady, Sven & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Strategic experimentation with private payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 531-551.
    4. Quitz'e Valenzuela-Stookey, 2020. "Screening and Information-Sharing Externalities," Papers 2011.04013, arXiv.org.
    5. Cripps, Martin W. & Thomas, Caroline D., 2019. "Strategic experimentation in queues," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.

  4. Caroline D. Thomas, 2009. "N-Dimensional Blotto Game with Asymmetric Battlefield Values," Department of Economics Working Papers 130116, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2016.

    Cited by:

    1. Maria Montero & Alex Possajennikov & Martin Sefton & Theodore Turocy, 2016. "Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 55-89, January.
    2. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2015. "The Optimal Defense of Network Connectivity," Working Papers 15-24, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    3. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock & David Rojo Arjona & Nathaniel T. Wilcox, 2016. "Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-battle Contests," Working Papers 16-16, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    4. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2018. "The Optimal Defense Of Networks Of Targets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2195-2211, October.
    5. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    6. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2013. "The Lottery Blotto Game," Working Papers 2072/211806, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    7. Maria Montero & Alex Possajennikov & Martin Sefton & Theodore Turocy, 2013. "Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields: An Experiment," Discussion Papers 2013-12, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    8. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2015. "Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto Games," Working Papers 15-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    9. Scott Macdonell & Nick Mastronardi, 2015. "Waging simple wars: a complete characterization of two-battlefield Blotto equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 183-216, January.
    10. Avrahami, Judith & Kareev, Yaakov & Todd, Peter M. & Silverman, Boaz, 2014. "Allocation of resources in asymmetric competitions: How do the weak maintain a chance of winning?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 161-174.
    11. Kostyantyn Mazur, 2017. "A Partial Solution to Continuous Blotto," Papers 1706.08479, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2017.

  5. Caroline D. Thomas & Martin W. Cripps, "undated". "Strategic Experimentation in Queues," Department of Economics Working Papers 140228, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2016.

    Cited by:

    1. Eeva Mauring, 2017. "Informational Cycles in Search Markets," Vienna Economics Papers vie1708, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    2. Ignacio Monzón, 2017. "Observational Learning in Large Anonymous Games," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 509, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    3. Eyster, Erik & Galeotti, Andrea & Kartik, Navin & Rabin, Matthew, 2014. "Congested observational learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 519-538.
    4. Zhang, Min, 2021. "Non-monotone social learning," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 565-579.

  6. Caroline D. Thomas, "undated". "Career Concerns and Policy Intransigence - A Dynamic Signalling Model," Department of Economics Working Papers 161228, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2016.

    Cited by:

    1. Marina Halac & Ilan Kremer, 2020. "Experimenting with Career Concerns," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 260-288, February.

Articles

  1. Caroline D. Thomas, 2021. "Strategic Experimentation with Congestion," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 1-82, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. V. Bhaskar & Caroline Thomas, 2019. "The Culture of Overconfidence," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 95-110, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. V Bhaskar & Caroline Thomas, 2019. "Community Enforcement of Trust with Bounded Memory," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 86(3), pages 1010-1032.

    Cited by:

    1. Sergey Kovbasyuk & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021. "Memory And Markets," Working Papers w0284, New Economic School (NES).
    2. S. Nageeb Ali & David A. Miller, 2020. "Communication and Cooperation in Markets," Papers 2005.09839, arXiv.org.
    3. Daniel Monte & Roberto Pinheiro, 2017. "Costly Information Intermediation as a Natural Monopoly," Working Papers 17-21R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

  4. Cripps, Martin W. & Thomas, Caroline D., 2019. "Strategic experimentation in queues," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Thomas, Caroline, 2019. "Experimentation with reputation concerns – Dynamic signalling with changing types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 366-415.

    Cited by:

    1. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2019. "Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation," ISER Discussion Paper 1060r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Aug 2020.
    2. Chen, Wanyi, 2021. "Dynamic survival bias in optimal stopping problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).

  6. Caroline Thomas, 2018. "N-dimensional Blotto game with heterogeneous battlefield values," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(3), pages 509-544, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Kovenock, Dan & Roberson, Brian & Sheremeta, Roman, 2018. "The attack and defense of weakest-link networks," MPRA Paper 89292, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Sebasti'an Morales & Charles Thraves, 2020. "On the Resource Allocation for Political Campaigns," Papers 2012.02856, arXiv.org.
    3. Brian Roberson & Oz Shy, 2021. "Costly force relocation in the Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(1), pages 39-52, April.
    4. Shy, Oz, 2021. "Multimarket lobbying with reserves," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 106-112.
    5. Christian Ewerhart & Dan Kovenock, 2019. "A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games with Multidimensional Private Information," Working Papers 19-29, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    6. Boix-Adserà, Enric & Edelman, Benjamin L. & Jayanti, Siddhartha, 2021. "The multiplayer Colonel Blotto game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 15-31.
    7. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2015. "Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto Games," Working Papers 15-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    8. Jonathan Lamb & Justin Grana & Nicholas O’Donoughue, 2022. "The Benefits of Fractionation in Competitive Resource Allocation," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 59(2), pages 831-852, February.
    9. Enric Boix-Adser`a & Benjamin L. Edelman & Siddhartha Jayanti, 2020. "The Multiplayer Colonel Blotto Game," Papers 2002.05240, arXiv.org, revised May 2021.
    10. Cortes-Corrales, Sebastián & Gorny, Paul M., 2018. "Generalising Conflict Networks," MPRA Paper 90001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Sebastián Morales & Charles Thraves, 2021. "On the Resource Allocation for Political Campaigns," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(11), pages 4140-4159, November.

  7. Guéron, Yves & Lamadon, Thibaut & Thomas, Caroline D., 2011. "On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 287-295, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Carmona, Guilherme & Carvalho, Luís, 2016. "Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 131-138.
    2. Daniel Cardona & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2016. "Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(2), pages 1-17, May.
    3. Kimmo Berg, 2017. "Extremal Pure Strategies and Monotonicity in Repeated Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 49(3), pages 387-404, March.
    4. Sugaya, Takuo, 2015. "Characterizing the limit set of PPE payoffs with unequal discounting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
    5. Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2020. "Myopic perception in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-14.
    6. Chen, Bo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 571-581.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 3 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2014-03-15 2017-01-08
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2014-03-15
  3. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2018-03-26
  4. NEP-PPM: Project, Program & Portfolio Management (1) 2018-03-26

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Caroline D. Thomas should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.