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A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games with Multidimensional Private Information

Author

Listed:
  • Christian Ewerhart

    (Department of Economics, University of Zurich)

  • Dan Kovenock

    (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University)

Abstract

We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battleelds. An agents vector of battleeld valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agents resource allocation to a given battleeld is strictly monotone in the agents valuation of that battleeld. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension to networks of Blotto games.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Ewerhart & Dan Kovenock, 2019. "A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games with Multidimensional Private Information," Working Papers 19-29, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:19-29
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    File URL: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/289/
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Keith Paarporn & Adel Aghajan & Jason R. Marden, 2025. "Allocation of Heterogeneous Resources in General Lotto Games," Papers 2505.02860, arXiv.org.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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