IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/chu/wpaper/21-01.html

A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games With Multidimensional Private Information

Author

Listed:
  • Christian Ewerhart

    (Department of Economics, University of Zurich)

  • Dan Kovenock

    (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University)

Abstract

In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which the resource allocation to a given battleÖeld is strictly monotone in the valuation of that battlefield. We also explore extensions such as heterogeneous budgets, the case M N, full-support type distributions, and network games.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Ewerhart & Dan Kovenock, 2021. "A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games With Multidimensional Private Information," Working Papers 21-01, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:21-01
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/338/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Keith Paarporn & Adel Aghajan & Jason R. Marden, 2025. "Allocation of Heterogeneous Resources in General Lotto Games," Papers 2505.02860, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:21-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Megan Luetje (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/esichus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.