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Nigel Moes

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First Name:Nigel
Middle Name:
Last Name:Moes
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RePEc Short-ID:pmo525
http://www.nigelmoes.nl

Research output

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Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Rene van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2012. "A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-050/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  2. Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2012. "Transboundary Externalities and Property Rights: An International River Pollution Model," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-006/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  3. Rene van den Brink & Arantza Estevez-Fernandez & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2011. "Independence Axioms for Water Allocation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-128/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  4. Rene van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2011. "Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-164/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  5. Rene van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2010. "Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-096/1, Tinbergen Institute.

Articles

  1. René Brink & Gerard Laan & Nigel Moes, 2015. "Values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 23(1), pages 77-99, April.
  2. René Brink & Arantza Estévez-Fernández & Gerard Laan & Nigel Moes, 2014. "Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 173-194, June.
  3. van den Brink, René & van der Laan, Gerard & Moes, Nigel, 2013. "A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2737-2748.
  4. van den Brink, René & van der Laan, Gerard & Moes, Nigel, 2012. "Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 388-403.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Rene van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2012. "A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-050/1, Tinbergen Institute.

    Cited by:

    1. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2017. "A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games," Post-Print halshs-01381379, HAL.
    2. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2015. "Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel," Post-Print halshs-01212115, HAL.
    3. Philippe Solal & Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Eric Rémila, 2017. "Axiomatic and bargaining foundation of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games," Post-Print halshs-01644811, HAL.

  2. Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2012. "Transboundary Externalities and Property Rights: An International River Pollution Model," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-006/1, Tinbergen Institute.

    Cited by:

    1. Houba, Harold & van der Laan, Gerard & Zeng, Yuyu, 2014. "Asymmetric Nash Solutions in the River Sharing Problem," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 4(4), pages 321-360, December.
    2. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Maria Gomez-Rua & Elena Molis, 2018. "Allocating the costs of cleaning a river; estimating responsibilities versus incentive compatibility," ThE Papers 18/02, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    3. Jie He & Anping Huang & Luodan Xu, 2015. "Spatial heterogeneity and transboundary pollution: a contingent valuation study on the Xijiang River drainage basin in south China," Cahiers de recherche 15-04, Departement d'Economique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
    4. He, Jie & Huang, Anping & Xu, Luodan, 2015. "Spatial heterogeneity and transboundary pollution: A contingent valuation (CV) study on the Xijiang River drainage basin in south China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 101-130.
    5. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & María Gómez-Rúa & Elena Molis, 2013. "Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 1301, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.

  3. Rene van den Brink & Arantza Estevez-Fernandez & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2011. "Independence Axioms for Water Allocation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-128/1, Tinbergen Institute.

    Cited by:

    1. Ambec, Stefan & Dinar, Ariel & McKinney, Daene, 2013. "Water sharing agreements sustainable to reduced flows," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 639-655.
    2. Ansink, Erik & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2013. "Composition properties in the river claims problem," MPRA Paper 51618, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2012. "Transboundary Externalities and Property Rights: An International River Pollution Model," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-006/1, Tinbergen Institute.

  4. Rene van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2010. "Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-096/1, Tinbergen Institute.

    Cited by:

    1. Houba, Harold & van der Laan, Gerard & Zeng, Yuyu, 2014. "Asymmetric Nash Solutions in the River Sharing Problem," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 4(4), pages 321-360, December.
    2. Sylvain Béal & Éric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2012. "Weighted component fairness for forest games," Post-Print halshs-00678832, HAL.
    3. René van den Brink & Simin He & Jia-Ping Huang, 2015. "Polluted River Problems and Games with a Permission Structure," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-108/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Erik Ansink & Michael Gengenbach & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2012. "River Sharing and Water Trade," Working Papers 2012.17, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Rene van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2012. "A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-050/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Rene van den Brink & Arantza Estevez-Fernandez & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2011. "Independence Axioms for Water Allocation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-128/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Ambec, Stefan & Dinar, Ariel & McKinney, Daene, 2013. "Water sharing agreements sustainable to reduced flows," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 639-655.
    8. René Brink & Arantza Estévez-Fernández & Gerard Laan & Nigel Moes, 2014. "Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 173-194, June.
    9. Harold Houba & Erik Ansink, 2013. "Sustainable Agreements on Stochastic River Flow," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-182/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    10. Anna Khmelnitskaya & Gerard van der Laan & Dolf Talman, 2016. "Centrality Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-070/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    11. René Brink & Gerard Laan & Nigel Moes, 2015. "Values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 23(1), pages 77-99, April.
    12. Sylvain Béal & Amandine Ghintran & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2012. "The Sequential Equal Surplus Division for Sharing International Rivers with Bifurcations," Working Papers 2012-02, CRESE.
    13. Sarina Steinmann und Ralph Winkler, 2015. "Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities," Diskussionsschriften dp1508, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    14. Harold Houba & Gerard Laan & Yuyu Zeng, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 855-872, December.
    15. Erik Ansink & Harold Houba, 2014. "The Economics of Transboundary River Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-132/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    16. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Maria Gomez-Rua & Elena Molis, 2018. "Allocating the costs of cleaning a river; estimating responsibilities versus incentive compatibility," ThE Papers 18/02, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    17. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "The sequential equal surplus division for sharing a river," MPRA Paper 37346, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Grundel, S. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M., 2013. "Resource Allocation Problems with Concave Reward Functions," Discussion Paper 2013-070, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    19. Ansink, Erik & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2013. "Composition properties in the river claims problem," MPRA Paper 51618, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Encarnacion Algaba & René van den Brink & Chris Dietz, 2015. "Power Measures and Solutions for Games under Precedence Constraints," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-007/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    21. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & María Gómez-Rúa & Elena Molis, 2013. "Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 1301, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
    22. Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2012. "Transboundary Externalities and Property Rights: An International River Pollution Model," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-006/1, Tinbergen Institute.

Articles

  1. René Brink & Gerard Laan & Nigel Moes, 2015. "Values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 23(1), pages 77-99, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Mario Guajardo & Kurt Jörnsten & Mikael Rönnqvist, 2016. "Constructive and blocking power in collaborative transportation," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 38(1), pages 25-50, January.

  2. René Brink & Arantza Estévez-Fernández & Gerard Laan & Nigel Moes, 2014. "Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 173-194, June.

    Cited by:

    1. René van den Brink & Simin He & Jia-Ping Huang, 2015. "Polluted River Problems and Games with a Permission Structure," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-108/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Harold Houba & Erik Ansink, 2013. "Sustainable Agreements on Stochastic River Flow," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-182/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Erik Ansink & Carmen Marchiori, 2009. "Reallocating Water: An Application of Sequent," Working Papers 2009.126, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Erik Ansink & Harold Houba, 2014. "The Economics of Transboundary River Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-132/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. Ansink, Erik & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2013. "Composition properties in the river claims problem," MPRA Paper 51618, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  3. van den Brink, René & van der Laan, Gerard & Moes, Nigel, 2013. "A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2737-2748.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. van den Brink, René & van der Laan, Gerard & Moes, Nigel, 2012. "Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 388-403.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2010-10-09 2012-05-15 2012-08-23. Author is listed
  2. NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (1) 2012-08-23. Author is listed
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2012-05-15. Author is listed

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