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Anindya Bhattacharya

Personal Details

First Name:Anindya
Middle Name:
Last Name:Bhattacharya
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pbh97
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Department of Economics and Related Studies
University of York

York, United Kingdom
http://www.york.ac.uk/economics/
RePEc:edi:deyoruk (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. A Bhattacharya & V Brosi & F Ciardiello, 2010. "A Non-empty Core May Not Coincide with the Uncovered Set in Spatial Voting Situations," Discussion Papers 10/01, Department of Economics, University of York.
  2. A Bhattacharya & H Newhouse, 2010. "Allocative Efficiency and an Incentive Scheme for Research," Discussion Papers 10/02, Department of Economics, University of York.
  3. Francesco Ciardiello & Anindya Bhattacharya & Victoria Brosi, 2009. "Some Results on Von Neumann and Morgenstern's Stable Set in Multidimentional Majority Rule Games," Quaderni DSEMS 05-2009, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
  4. BHATTACHARYA, Anindya & ZIAD, Abderrahmane, 2003. "On conservative stable standard of behaviour in situations with perfect foresight," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003049, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. A Bhattacharya & A Ziad, "undated". "On Credible Coalitional Deviations by Prudent Players," Discussion Papers 09/33, Department of Economics, University of York.
  6. A Bhattacharya, "undated". "Stable and Efficient Networks with Farsighted Players: the Largest Consistent Set," Discussion Papers 09/34, Department of Economics, University of York.

Articles

  1. Bhattacharya, Anindya & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2006. "The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: A note," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 25-30, January.
  2. Anindya Bhattacharya, 2004. "Book Review," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(1), pages 157-160, August.
  3. Anindya Bhattacharya, 2004. "On the equal division core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 391-399, April.
  4. Bhattacharya, Anindya, 2002. "Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 27-44, January.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. A Bhattacharya & H Newhouse, 2010. "Allocative Efficiency and an Incentive Scheme for Research," Discussion Papers 10/02, Department of Economics, University of York.

    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Abramo & Ciriaco Andrea D’Angelo, 2011. "National-scale research performance assessment at the individual level," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 86(2), pages 347-364, February.
    2. Giovanni Abramo & Ciriaco Andrea D’Angelo & Tindaro Cicero, 2012. "What is the appropriate length of the publication period over which to assess research performance?," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 93(3), pages 1005-1017, December.
    3. Giovanni Abramo & Tindaro Cicero & Ciriaco Andrea D’Angelo, 2011. "The dangers of performance-based research funding in non-competitive higher education systems," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 87(3), pages 641-654, June.
    4. Manfredi M. A. La Manna, 2008. "Assessing The Assessment Or, The Rae And The Optimal Organization Of University Research," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(5), pages 637-653, November.

  2. BHATTACHARYA, Anindya & ZIAD, Abderrahmane, 2003. "On conservative stable standard of behaviour in situations with perfect foresight," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003049, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    Cited by:

    1. Page Jr, Frank H & Wooders, Myrna H. & Kamat, Samir, 2002. "Networks And Farsighted Stability," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 660, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

  3. A Bhattacharya & A Ziad, "undated". "On Credible Coalitional Deviations by Prudent Players," Discussion Papers 09/33, Department of Economics, University of York.

    Cited by:

    1. Kimya, Mert, 2020. "Equilibrium coalitional behavior," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    2. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2013. "Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2013-1, Brown University, Department of Economics.

  4. A Bhattacharya, "undated". "Stable and Efficient Networks with Farsighted Players: the Largest Consistent Set," Discussion Papers 09/34, Department of Economics, University of York.

    Cited by:

    1. Béal, Sylvain & Durieu, Jacques & Solal, Philippe, 2008. "Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 303-313, November.
    2. Jean-Jacques, HERINGS & Ana, MAULEON & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH, 2006. "Farsightedly stable networks," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006046, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
    3. Kimya, Mert, 2020. "Equilibrium coalitional behavior," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    4. Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2015. "Cautious Farsighted Stability in Network Formation Games with Streams of Payoffs," Vienna Economics Papers vie1509, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Bhattacharya, Anindya & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2006. "The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: A note," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 25-30, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Yi-You Yang, 2020. "On the characterizations of viable proposals," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(4), pages 453-469, November.
    2. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Kóczy, László Á., 2021. "The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 67-79.

  2. Anindya Bhattacharya, 2004. "On the equal division core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 391-399, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Takaaki Abe & Yukihiko Funaki, 2018. "The Unbinding Core for Coalitional Form Games," Working Papers 1805, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    2. Philipp Otto & Friedel Bolle, 2011. "Matching markets with price bargaining," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(3), pages 322-348, September.
    3. Llerena Garrés, Francesc & Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia, 2013. "The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core," Working Papers 2072/212194, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    4. Seiji Takanashi, 2018. "Analysis of the core under inequality-averse utility functions," KIER Working Papers 1006, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    5. Brânzei, R. & Dimitrov, D.A. & Tijs, S.H., 2004. "Egalitarianism in convex fuzzy games," Other publications TiSEM feab7e25-2f43-47e3-9658-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Cori Vilella, 2014. "The equity core and the core," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(1), pages 313-323.
    7. Carles Rafels & Cori Vilella, 2005. "Proportional Share Analysis," Working Papers 218, Barcelona School of Economics.
    8. Vilella Bach, Misericòrdia, 2013. "The equity core and the core," Working Papers 2072/220760, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    9. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Yanovskaya, E., 2020. "Antiduality in Exact Partition Games," Other publications TiSEM 0b8133f8-cab7-46ae-8881-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels & Cori Vilella, 2008. "A simple procedure for computing strong constrained egalitarian allocations," Working Papers 327, Barcelona School of Economics.
    11. Friedel Bolle & Philipp E. Otto, 2016. "Role-dependent Social Preferences," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 704-740, October.
    12. Francesc Llerena & Llúcia Mauri, 2015. "On the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(4), pages 2475-2481.
    13. Rogna, Marco, 2021. "The central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 1-11.
    14. Francesc Llerena & Carles Rafels, 2005. "On reasonable outcomes and the core in cooperative TU games," Working Papers 160, Barcelona School of Economics.
    15. Llerena Garrés, Francesc & Mauri Masdeu, Llúcia, 2014. "A note on the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set," Working Papers 2072/228404, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    16. Brânzei, R. & Llorca, N. & Sánchez-Soriano, J. & Tijs, S.H., 2007. "Egalitarianism in Multi-Choice Games," Other publications TiSEM bfbd67a5-701f-4be7-a1c9-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    17. Brânzei, R. & Llorca, N. & Sánchez-Soriano, J. & Tijs, S.H., 2007. "Egalitarianism in Multi-Choice Games," Discussion Paper 2007-55, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    18. Keyzer, Michiel & van Wesenbeeck, Cornelia, 2011. "Optimal coalition formation and surplus distribution: Two sides of one coin," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(3), pages 604-615, December.

  3. Bhattacharya, Anindya, 2002. "Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 27-44, January.

    Cited by:

    1. BHATTACHARYA, Anindya & ZIAD, Abderrahmane, 2003. "On conservative stable standard of behaviour in situations with perfect foresight," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003049, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Anindya Bhattacharya & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2012. "On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 537-552, July.
    3. Damiano, Ettore & Lam, Ricky, 2005. "Stability in dynamic matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 34-53, July.
    4. M. Martin & V. Merlin, 2000. "Stability Set as Social Choice Correspondence," THEMA Working Papers 2000-44, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    5. Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2003. "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 185-203, April.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 3 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 2009-09-26 2010-01-23
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2009-09-26 2010-01-23
  3. NEP-SOG: Sociology of Economics (1) 2010-01-23

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