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Is Agribusiness Different? Firm-Level Evidence of Perceived Corruption in Post-Soviet Countries

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  • Herzfeld, Thomas
  • Kulyk, Iryna
  • Wolz, Axel

Abstract

We investigated firm-level perceptions of corruption, based on two enterprise surveys conducted across eight countries of the former Soviet Union. In addition to identifying the perceived major obstacles to business operations, the article looks at whether managers in the agribusiness sector perceive corruption differently than do managers in other sectors. The empirical analysis makes use of the most recent wave of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted between 2012 and 2013, complemented by our own survey conducted in 2016. The results paint a heterogeneous picture. One-fifth of the respondents to BEEPS agree that private payments or gifts to local officials have a moderate or high direct impact, whereas the rate of agreement declines when asked about parliamentarians or government officials. Results of a range of econometric models, however, do not reveal differences between agribusiness and other sectors at large. Only in two of ten specifications do respondents from agribusiness tend to perceive corruption as occurring less frequently than do respondents from other sectors. However, country effects seem to be more important than intersectoral differences in the perception of corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Herzfeld, Thomas & Kulyk, Iryna & Wolz, Axel, 2018. "Is Agribusiness Different? Firm-Level Evidence of Perceived Corruption in Post-Soviet Countries," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 56(6), pages 504-521.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:185558
    DOI: 10.1080/00128775.2018.1503937
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    agribusiness; business obstacles; CIS countries; quality of institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal

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