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Unilateral cross‐ownership and emission‐reduction technology sharing in a duopoly

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  • Junlong Chen
  • Xiaomin Sun
  • Jiali Liu

Abstract

This study constructs a Cournot duopoly model that considers unilateral cross‐ownership and emission‐reduction technology sharing, compares the equilibrium results under different cases, explores the impacts of unilateral cross‐ownership and technology sharing, and analyzes the boundary conditions for realizing technology sharing. The results indicate that unilateral cross‐ownership has complex effects on the equilibrium results. Emission‐reduction technology plays a positive role in improving environmental and social welfare. Furthermore, the boundary conditions of technology sharing were found to be affected by the carbon tax, cost‐reduction effect of emission‐reduction technology, and cross‐ownership.

Suggested Citation

  • Junlong Chen & Xiaomin Sun & Jiali Liu, 2024. "Unilateral cross‐ownership and emission‐reduction technology sharing in a duopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 45(2), pages 624-636, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:45:y:2024:i:2:p:624-636
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.4022
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