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Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions

  • Kai A. Konrad

    (Social Science Center Berlin (WZB), Germany, and Department of Economics, Free University of Berlin, Germany)

  • Wolfgang Peters

    (Department of Economics, European University Viadrina, Germany)

  • Karl Wärneryd

    (Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden)

In a first-price all-pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non-cooperative delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1182
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Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Managerial and Decision Economics.

Volume (Year): 25 (2004)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 283-290

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Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:5:p:283-290
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976

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  1. Ellingsen, T., 1990. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," Papers 05-90, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  2. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  3. Warneryd, Karl, 1998. "Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 435-450, September.
  4. Konrad, Kai A., 2000. "Spatial contests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 965-974, August.
  5. Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, 1994. "Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 117-131, Spring.
  6. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, 03.
  7. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1991. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1007, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  8. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May.
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