Delegation and strategic incentives for managers in contests
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DOI: 10.1002/mde.1091
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Jost, Peter-J., 2011. "Joint ventures in patent contests with spillovers and the role of strategic budgeting," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(6), pages 605-637.
- Münster, Johannes, 2006. "Contests with Investment," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 120, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Krakel, Matthias & Sliwka, Dirk, 2006.
"Strategic delegation and mergers in oligopolistic contests,"
Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 119-136.
- Kräkel, Matthias & Sliwka, Dirk, 2002. "Strategic Delegation and Mergers in Oligopolistic Contests," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 2/2002, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Alex Possajennikov, 2009.
"Commitment in symmetric contests,"
Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(1), pages 375-383.
- Alex Possajennikov, 2008. "Commitment in Symmetric Contests," Discussion Papers 08/13, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
- Kopel, Michael & Brand, Björn, 2012. "Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 982-989.
- Münster, Johannes, 2006. "Contests with investment [Wettkämpfe mit Investitionen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-09, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Johannes Münster, 2007. "Contests with investment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 849-862.
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