Commitment in symmetric contests
The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does not increase a player''s payoff for any number of players.
Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Onsong Shin & Michael R. Baye, 1999. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 691-693, June.
- Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
- Matthias Kräkel, 2002. "Delegation and strategic incentives for managers in contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(8), pages 461-470.
- Alex Possajennikov, 2008.
"On the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior and Delegation in Contests,"
2008-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Alex Possajennikov, 2008. "On the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior and Delegation in Contests," Discussion Papers 2008-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-898, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08c70062. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.