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Voluntary Reserve Targets

Author

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  • GARTH BAUGHMAN
  • FRANCESCA CARAPELLA

Abstract

We study monetary policy implementation through an operating regime involving voluntary reserve targets (VRTs). Operating regimes based on reserve requirements may lead to a collapse in interbank trade, as they have since the financial crisis. We show that, no matter the abundance of reserves, VRTs encourage market activity and support the central bank's control over interest rates. We consider (i) the impact of anticipated and unanticipated liquidity injections by the central bank on market outcomes and (ii) a comparison with the implementation framework currently adopted by the Federal Reserve. Overall, a VRT framework may provide several advantages over other frameworks.

Suggested Citation

  • Garth Baughman & Francesca Carapella, 2020. "Voluntary Reserve Targets," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(2-3), pages 583-612, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:52:y:2020:i:2-3:p:583-612
    DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.12579
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    Cited by:

    1. Garth Baughman & Francesca Carapella, 2023. "A Simple Model of Voluntary Reserve Targets with Tolerance Bands," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(2-3), pages 655-672, March.
    2. Francesca Carapella & Jin-Wook Chang & Sebastian Infante & Melissa Leistra & Arazi Lubis & Alexandros Vardoulakis, 2024. "Financial Stability Implications of CBDC," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2024-021, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Jonathan Witmer, 2020. "Monetary Policy Independence and the Strength of the Global Financial Cycle," Staff Working Papers 20-26, Bank of Canada.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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