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What explains collective action: The impact of social capital, incentive structures and economic benefits

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  • Engjell Skreli
  • Orjon Xhoxhi
  • Drini Imami
  • Klodjan Rama

Abstract

This study focuses in testing the power of reciprocity and leadership as collective action incentive structures and cooperation economic benefits in explaining collective action initiation in the context of a post‐communist transition economy. The paper is based on a structured survey targeting Albanian export‐oriented farmers. Different from most previous studies, this paper uses both regression analysis and machine learning procedure which is better suited for analysing non‐linear relationships. The empirical findings are at odds with common sense that non‐cooperation is the dominant strategy, because the presence of tolerant reciprocators and leadership resources provide promising incentive structures for collective action development.

Suggested Citation

  • Engjell Skreli & Orjon Xhoxhi & Drini Imami & Klodjan Rama, 2024. "What explains collective action: The impact of social capital, incentive structures and economic benefits," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(3), pages 1622-1646, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:36:y:2024:i:3:p:1622-1646
    DOI: 10.1002/jid.3873
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