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On the limits of free trade in a Cournot world: When are restrictions on trade beneficial?

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  • Rabah Amir
  • Jim Y. Jin
  • Michael Troege

Abstract

This paper examines marginal deviations from free trade in an asymmetric Cournot world. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which: (i) small import tariffs, (ii) export subsidies, (iii) production subsidies and (iv) consumption taxes increase country‐level as well as world social welfare and consumer surplus. We find that free trade is generally not optimal: some countries' tariffs or subsidies can always improve world welfare. Every country's export subsidy raises the average of world social welfare and consumer surplus. Finally, we rank the different policies and show that production subsidies are most likely to raise world social welfare, followed by export subsidies and then import tariffs, whereas consumption taxes never do. Au sujet des limites du libre‐échange dans un monde de Cournot : dans quelles situations les restrictions commerciales sont‐elles utiles? Cet article examine les déviations marginales par rapport au libre‐échange dans un monde de Cournot asymétrique. Nous fournissons les conditions nécessaires et suffisantes en vertu desquelles de petits droits de douane, subventions à l'exportation, subventions à la production et taxes à la consommation augmentent le bien‐être collectif et le surplus du consommateur à l'échelle nationale et mondiale. Nous constatons que le libre‐échange n'est généralement pas optimal. Les droits ou les subventions de certains pays peuvent toujours améliorer le bien‐être à l'échelle mondiale. Chaque subvention à l'exportation d'un pays accroît la somme du bien‐être collectif et du surplus du consommateur mondiaux. Enfin, nous classons les diverses politiques et montrons que les subventions à la production sont plus susceptibles d'augmenter le bien‐être collectif mondial, suivies des subventions à l'exportation et enfin des droits de douane. Par contre, ce n'est jamais le cas pour les taxes à la consommation.

Suggested Citation

  • Rabah Amir & Jim Y. Jin & Michael Troege, 2022. "On the limits of free trade in a Cournot world: When are restrictions on trade beneficial?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(4), pages 2036-2057, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:55:y:2022:i:4:p:2036-2057
    DOI: 10.1111/caje.12619
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