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Local Evidence and Diversity in Minipublics

Author

Listed:
  • Arjada Bardhi
  • Nina Bobkova

Abstract

A policymaker selects a minipublic—a group of citizens from a demographically diverse citizenry with access to local evidence about the impact of a policy. Citizens face uncertainty about the policymaker’s eventual policy bias, which is shown to discourage the most marginally informative minipublic citizens from discovering their evidence. We fully characterize the optimal minipublic composition. Relative to the most demographically representative minipublic, the optimal minipublic overrepresents demographics at the margins of the citizenry while underrepresenting those around the median citizen. The representativeness of the optimal minipublic varies nonmonotonically with uncertainty. Our findings bear practical implications for minipublic design.

Suggested Citation

  • Arjada Bardhi & Nina Bobkova, 2023. "Local Evidence and Diversity in Minipublics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(9), pages 2451-2508.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/724322
    DOI: 10.1086/724322
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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Carnehl & Johannes Schneider, 2025. "A Quest for Knowledge," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(2), pages 623-659, March.
    2. Martino Banchio & Suraj Malladi, 2025. "Rediscovery," Papers 2504.19761, arXiv.org.
    3. Arjada Bardhi, 2024. "Attributes: Selective Learning and Influence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(2), pages 311-353, March.
    4. Nemanja Antic & Harry Pei, 2026. "Selective Disclosure in Overlapping Generations," Papers 2602.09406, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
    5. Emilia Brito Rebolledo & Jesse Bruhn & Thea How Choon & E. Anna Weber, 2024. "Gender Composition and Group Behavior: Evidence from US City Councils," NBER Working Papers 33223, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Kailin Chen, 2025. "Communication with Multiple Senders," Papers 2505.14639, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2025.
    7. Jean-Michel Benkert, Ludmila Matyskova, Egor Starkov, 2024. "Strategic Attribute Learning," Diskussionsschriften dp2411, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    8. Disslbacher, Franziska & Haselmayer, Martin & Rapp, Severin & Lehner, Lukas & Windisch, Franziska, 2025. "The Good Council: Deliberating Inequality in a Field Experiment," SocArXiv zcuw6_v1, Center for Open Science.
    9. Doruk Cetemen & Can Urgun & Leeat Yariv, 2023. "Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(9), pages 2402-2450.
    10. Dong, Miaomiao & Mayskaya, Tatiana, 2024. "Does reducing communication barriers promote diversity?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    11. Jean-Michel Benkert & Ludmila Matyskova & Egor Starkov, 2024. "Strategic Attribute Learning," Papers 2412.10024, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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