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Political participation and party preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Nurfatima Jandarova

    (Tampere University, Finnish Centre of Excellence in Tax Systems Research (FIT))

  • Aldo Rustichini

    (University of Minnesota)

Abstract

Political behavior of citizens includes political participation and preferences. We show with UK data that political behavior is affected by individual characteristics that are also determining educational attainment, including cognitive abilities and intelligence. Our analysis reconciles the rational choice assumption with the acquisition of costly political information, which would otherwise give only negligible benefits. We disentangle the causal pathways by identifying effects operating directly and those operating indirectly, in particular through education and income. We address the issue of endogeneity of cognitive skills using polygenic scores, and show that an important component of the causal factors is genetic.

Suggested Citation

  • Nurfatima Jandarova & Aldo Rustichini, 2024. "Political participation and party preferences," Working Papers 25, Finnish Centre of Excellence in Tax Systems Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:fit:wpaper:25
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Tauchen, George, 1986. "Statistical Properties of Generalized Method-of-Moments Estimators of Structural Parameters Obtained from Financial Market Data: Reply," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 4(4), pages 423-425, October.
    4. Martinelli, Cesar, 2006. "Would rational voters acquire costly information?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 225-251, July.
    5. Aaron Edlin & Andrew Gelman & Noah Kaplan, 2007. "Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote to Improve the Well-Being of Others," NBER Working Papers 13562, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Joseph C. McMurray, 2013. "Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(1), pages 277-312.
    7. Tauchen, George, 1986. "Statistical Properties of Generalized Method-of-Moments Estimators of Structural Parameters Obtained from Financial Market Data," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 4(4), pages 397-416, October.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • I25 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Economic Development
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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