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Strategic Attribute Learning

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  • Jean-Michel Benkert, Ludmila Matyskova, Egor Starkov

Abstract

A researcher allocates a budget of informative tests across multiple unknown attributes to influence a decision-maker. We derive the researcher’s equilibrium learning strategy by solving an auxiliary single-player problem. The attribute weights in this problem depend on how much the researcher and the decision-maker disagree. If the researcher expects an excessive response to new information, she forgoes learning altogether. In an organizational context, we show that a manager favors more diverse analysts as the hierarchical distance grows. In another application, we show how an appropriately opposed advisor can constrain a discriminatory politician, and identify the welfare-inequality Pareto frontier of researchers.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Michel Benkert, Ludmila Matyskova, Egor Starkov, 2024. "Strategic Attribute Learning," Diskussionsschriften dp2411, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    • Handle: RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp2411
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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