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Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry

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  • Henry Schneider

Abstract

In this study, I investigate the effects of moral hazard in leasing contracts by examining the driving outcomes of all long-term lessees and owner-operators of New York City taxis. I find that moral hazard explains a sizable fraction of lessees' accidents, driving violations, and vehicle inspection failures. To address the possibility of endogenous contract choice, I conduct an instrumental variables analysis of the cross section of all drivers and a panel-data analysis of a subset of drivers who switched from leasing to owning.

Suggested Citation

  • Henry Schneider, 2010. "Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 783-805.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/652423
    DOI: 10.1086/652423
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    Cited by:

    1. Evan Rawley & Timothy S. Simcoe, 2010. "Diversification, Diseconomies of Scope, and Vertical Contracting: Evidence from the Taxicab Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(9), pages 1534-1550, September.
    2. Imke Reimers & Benjamin R. Shiller, 2018. "Welfare Implications of Proprietary Data Collection: An Application to Telematics in Auto Insurance," Working Papers 119R, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School, revised May 2018.
    3. Diao, Xinshen & Cossar, Frances & Houssou, Nazaire & Kolavalli, Shashidhara & Jimah, Kipo & Aboagye, Patrick, 2012. "Mechanization in Ghana: Searching for sustainable service supply models:," IFPRI discussion papers 1237, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    4. Loukas Balafoutas & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2017. "Second‐Degree Moral Hazard In A Real‐World Credence Goods Market," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(599), pages 1-18, February.
    5. C. Kirabo Jackson & Henry S. Schneider, 2011. "Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 244-267, July.
    6. C. Kirabo Jackson & Henry S. Schneider, 2013. "Reducing Moral Hazard in Employment Relationships: Experimental Evidence on Managerial Control and Performance Pay," NBER Working Papers 19645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Rajgopal, Shivaram & White, Roger, 2019. "Cheating when in the hole: The case of New York city taxis," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    8. George Geronikolaou, 2018. "A Note on Vertical Differentiation of Durable Goods: Sellers, Renters and Moral Hazard," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 97-106, March.
    9. Shohfi, Thomas D. & White, Roger M., 2022. "Does native country turmoil predict immigrant workers’ honesty in markets?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 150-164.
    10. Annamaria Menichini & Maria Grazia Romano, 2018. "Does the Master’s Eye Fatten the Cattle? Maintenance and Care of Collateral under Purchase and Leasing Contracts," CSEF Working Papers 520, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 15 Mar 2021.
    11. Kareem Haggag & Brian McManus & Giovanni Paci, 2017. "Learning by Driving: Productivity Improvements by New York City Taxi Drivers," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 70-95, January.
    12. Douthit, Jeremy & Millar, Melanie & White, Roger M., 2021. "Horseshoes, hand grenades, and regulatory enforcement: Close experience with potential sanctions and fraud deterrence," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 137-148.
    13. Kenchington, David G. & Shohfi, Thomas D. & Smith, Jared D. & White, Roger M., 2022. "Do sin tax hikes spur cheating in interpersonal exchange?," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    14. Brandyn F. Churchill & Taylor Mackay & Bing Yang Tan, 2021. "Unauthorized Immigrants' Access To Driver'S Licenses And Auto Insurance Coverage," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(1), pages 107-125, January.
    15. Chao Ma, 2021. "Be Cautious In The Last Month: The Sunk Cost Fallacy Held By Car Insurance Policyholders," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1199-1236, August.
    16. Imke Reimers & Benjamin R. Shiller, 2018. "Proprietary Data, Competition, and Consumer Effort: An Application to Telematics in Auto Insurance," Working Papers 119, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School.
    17. Justin P. Johnson & Henry S. Schneider & Michael Waldman, 2014. "The Role and Growth of New-Car Leasing: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(3), pages 665-698.
    18. Weisburd, Sarit & Bird, Daniel & Ben-Porath, Ronny, 2018. "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in the Leasing Market: Are Buybacks the Solution?," CEPR Discussion Papers 12633, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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