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Intrahousehold Allocation and Bargaining Power: Evidence from Chile

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  • Claudia Martínez A.

Abstract

Until 1999, children born out of wedlock in Chile had fewer child support rights than those born to married couples. I interpret a change in this law as an increase in the household bargaining power of women in cohabiting relationships. Using a panel of cross-sectional data, I find a decrease of 1.8 percentage points in the probability of working among men and an increase of 1.2 percentage points in school attendance of children under 19. These results provide evidence that contradicts the predictions of the unitary household model as well as the Nash bargaining model. The labor market outcomes support a model in which a reduction in men's relative bargaining power is understood as a tax on their wages.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudia Martínez A., 2013. "Intrahousehold Allocation and Bargaining Power: Evidence from Chile," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(3), pages 577-605.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:doi:10.1086/669260
    DOI: 10.1086/669260
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Berthelon, Matias E. & Kruger, Diana I., 2011. "Risky behavior among youth: Incapacitation effects of school on adolescent motherhood and crime in Chile," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1-2), pages 41-53, February.
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    6. Marcos A. Rangel, 2006. "Alimony Rights and Intrahousehold Allocation of Resources: Evidence from Brazil," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(513), pages 627-658, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yang, Dean, 2009. "International Migration and Human Development," MPRA Paper 19212, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Heggeness, Misty L., 2020. "Improving child welfare in middle income countries: The unintended consequence of a pro-homemaker divorce law and wait time to divorce," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    3. Nava Ashraf & Diego Aycinena & Claudia Martínez & Dean Yang, 2011. "Remittances and the Problem of Control: A Field Experiment Among Migrants from El Salvador," Working Papers wp341, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    4. Nava Ashraf & Diego Aycinena & Claudia Martínez A. & Dean Yang, 2015. "Savings in Transnational Households: A Field Experiment among Migrants from El Salvador," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 332-351, May.

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