IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/servic/v29y2006i6p847-859.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How passive ownership restrictions affect the rate of franchisee failure

Author

Listed:
  • Luis Vázquez

Abstract

What variables influence the adoption of passive ownership restrictions in franchise systems and what are the effects of these restrictions on the rate of franchisee failure of such systems? This article shows how standard performance models that do not account for self-selection of these contractual decisions can improperly suggest a negative relationship between the adoption of passive ownership restrictions and a performance outcome of franchise systems -- the rate of franchisee failure. However, models that do account for self-selection of these restrictions indicate that these contractual decisions per se do not affect such a performance outcome. The findings also show that franchise systems with misaligned passive ownership restrictions show a higher rate of franchisee failure than their better-aligned counterparts.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Vázquez, 2006. "How passive ownership restrictions affect the rate of franchisee failure," The Service Industries Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(6), pages 847-859, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:servic:v:29:y:2006:i:6:p:847-859
    DOI: 10.1080/02642060902749419
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/02642060902749419
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/02642060902749419?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brickley, James A. & Dark, Frederick H., 1987. "The choice of organizational form The case of franchising," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 401-420, June.
    2. Holmberg, Stevan R. & Morgan, Kathryn Boe, 2003. "Franchise turnover and failure: New research and perspectives," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 403-418, May.
    3. James J. Heckman, 1976. "Introduction to "Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 5, number 4"," NBER Chapters, in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 5, number 4, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. James G. Combs & David J. Ketchen, Jr., 1999. "Explaining interfirm cooperation and performance: toward a reconciliation of predictions from the resource‐based view and organizational economics," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(9), pages 867-888, September.
    5. Armstrong, J. Scott & Overton, Terry S., 1977. "Estimating Nonresponse Bias in Mail Surveys," MPRA Paper 81694, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    7. Rubin, Paul H, 1978. "The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 223-233, April.
    8. Erin Anderson, 1988. "Strategic Implications of Darwinian Economics for Selling Efficiency and Choice of Integrated or Independent Sales Forces," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(5), pages 599-618, May.
    9. Lafontaine, Francine & Shaw, Kathryn L., 1998. "Franchising growth and franchisor entry and exit in the U.S. market: Myth and reality," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 95-112, March.
    10. J. Myles Shaver, 1998. "Accounting for Endogeneity When Assessing Strategy Performance: Does Entry Mode Choice Affect FDI Survival?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 571-585, April.
    11. Brickley, James A, 1999. "Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 745-774, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Luis Vázquez, 2007. "Proportion of Franchised Outlets and Franchise System Performance," The Service Industries Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(7), pages 907-921, October.
    2. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2005. "Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from Franchising," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 131-150, Spring.
    3. Vanesa Solís-Rodríguez & Manuel González-Díaz, 2017. "Differences in contract design between successful and less successful franchises," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 483-502, December.
    4. Gillis, William E. & Combs, James G. & Yin, Xiaoli, 2020. "Franchise management capabilities and franchisor performance under alternative franchise ownership strategies," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 35(1).
    5. Luis Vázquez, 2008. "Complementarities between franchise contract duration and multi-unit propensity in franchise systems," The Service Industries Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(8), pages 1093-1105, October.
    6. Jindal, Rupinder, 2011. "Reducing the Size of Internal Hierarchy: The Case of Multi-Unit Franchising," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 87(4), pages 549-562.
    7. Anna Sadovnikova & Manish Kacker & Saurabh Mishra, 2023. "Franchising structure changes and shareholder value: Evidence from store buybacks and refranchising," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 51(5), pages 1098-1117, September.
    8. Muriel Fadairo & Cintya Lanchimba & Josef Windsperger, 2015. "Network Form and Performance. The Case of Multi-Unit Franchising," Working Papers halshs-01128075, HAL.
    9. Josef Windsperger, 2003. "Complementarities and Substitutabilities in Franchise Contracting: Some Results from the German Franchise Sector," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 7(3), pages 291-313, September.
    10. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 1999. "The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 1041-1080, October.
    11. Muriel Fadairo & Cyntia Lanchimba & Miguel Yangari, 2016. "Optimal Monetary Provisions and Risk Aversion in Plural Form Franchise Network. A Model of Incentives with Heterogeneous Agents," Working Papers 1602, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    12. Scott Shane, 2001. "Organizational Incentives and Organizational Mortality," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(2), pages 136-160, April.
    13. Arturs Kalnins, 2017. "Pricing Variation Within Dual-Distribution Chains: The Different Implications of Externalities and Signaling for High- and Low-Quality Brands," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(1), pages 139-152, January.
    14. Vázquez-Suárez, Luis & Mejía-Vásquez, Pericles Ramón & Serafim da Silva, Sheila & Sánchez-Gómez, Roberto, 2022. "Gender’s moderating role in the relationship between organisational form and performance in the Spanish supermarket industry," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    15. Xin Xu & James Y. L. Thong & Viswanath Venkatesh, 2014. "Effects of ICT Service Innovation and Complementary Strategies on Brand Equity and Customer Loyalty in a Consumer Technology Market," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 25(4), pages 710-729, December.
    16. Paul Tracey & Owen Jarvis, 2007. "Toward a Theory of Social Venture Franchising," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 31(5), pages 667-685, September.
    17. Emmanuel Raynaud, 2010. "The Structure of Franchise Contracts," Chapters, in: Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 20, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, 1998. "Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision," NBER Working Papers 6544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Dnes, Antony & Garoupa, Nuno, 2005. "Externality and organizational choice in franchising," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 139-149.
    20. Pierre Azoulay & Scott Shane, 2001. "Entrepreneurs, Contracts, and the Failure of Young Firms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(3), pages 337-358, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:servic:v:29:y:2006:i:6:p:847-859. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/FSIJ20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.