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What Monetary Policy after the Crisis?


  • Philip Arestis
  • Malcolm Sawyer


The objective of this paper is to reflect on some of the implications that recent economic experience has for monetary and financial stability policies. We contend that the financial crisis and the upsurge in inflation 2007-08 have shown that the policy model based on the new consensus in macroeconomics, which largely held sway over the past decade or more, is broken. It is argued that inflation targeting cannot deliver low inflation. We argue that fine-tuning through interest rates should not be attempted, but rather a constant real interest rate target based on the output growth rate should be adopted. The key objective of monetary policy should be shifted to financial stability, the independence of central banks should be brought to an end, and their decision making should be coordinated with other macroeconomic policy initiatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2010. "What Monetary Policy after the Crisis?," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 499-515.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:revpoe:v:22:y:2010:i:4:p:499-515 DOI: 10.1080/09538259.2010.510313

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2002. "Can Monetary Policy Affect The Real Economy?," Macroeconomics 0209012, EconWPA.
    2. Philip Arestis & Georgios E Chortareas, 2008. "Atheoretical and Theory-Based Approaches to the Natural Equilibrium Real Interest Rate," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 34(3), pages 390-405.
    3. Axel A. Weber & Wolfgang Lemke & Andreas Worms, 2008. "How useful is the concept of the natural real rate of interest for monetary policy?," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 49-63, January.
    4. Alvaro Angeriz & Philip Arestis, 2008. "Assessing inflation targeting through intervention analysis," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(2), pages 293-317, April.
    5. James Forder, 2004. "Central bank independence: economic theory, evidence and political legitimacy," Chapters,in: The Rise of the Market, chapter 6 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Alvaro Angeriz & Philip Arestis, 2007. "Monetary policy in the UK," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(6), pages 863-884, November.
    7. Forder, James, 1998. "The case for an independent European central bank: A reassessment of evidence and sources," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 53-71, February.
    8. Philip Arestis & Fernando Ferrari-Filho & Luiz Fernando de Paula, 2011. "Inflation targeting in Brazil," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 127-148.
    9. Arestis, Philip & Sawyer, Malcolm, 2008. "New consensus macroeconomics and inflation targeting: Keynesian critique," Revista Economia e Sociedade, Instituto de Economia, Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), vol. 35, pages 1-25, April.
    10. Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2010. "The return of fiscal policy," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(3), pages 327-346, April.
    11. Claude Gnos & Louis-Philippe Rochon (ed.), 2006. "Post-Keynesian Principles of Economic Policy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3407.
    12. Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2008. "A critical reconsideration of the foundations of monetary policy in the new consensus macroeconomics framework," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(5), pages 761-779, September.
    13. Fabian Valencia & Luc Laeven, 2008. "Systemic Banking Crises; A New Database," IMF Working Papers 08/224, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Malcolm Sawyer, 2009. "Interest rates and inflation: What are the links?," European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 6(1), pages 81-96.
    15. Forder, James, 1998. "Central Bank Independence--Conceptual Clarifications and Interim Assessment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 307-334, July.
    16. Philip Arestis, 2009. "New Consensus Macroeconomics: A Critical Appraisal," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_564, Levy Economics Institute.
    17. Michael J. Dueker & Andreas M. Fischer, 2006. "Do inflation targeters outperform non-targeters?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 431-450.
    18. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arturo Hermann, 2012. "Policy responses to economic and financial crises: insights from heterodox economics and psychoanalysis," International Journal of Pluralism and Economics Education, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 3(1), pages 8-22.
    2. Carré, Emmanuel, 2013. "La cible d’inflation de la Fed : continuité ou rupture ?," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 14.
    3. Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, 2013. "Moving from Inflation Targeting to Prices and Incomes Policy," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 60(1), pages 1-17, March.

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