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Monetary policy and wage bargaining in the EMU: restrictive ECB policies, high unemployment, nominal wage restraint and inflation above the target

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  • Eckhard Hein

    () (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI) in der Hans Boeckler Stiftung, Düsseldorf (Germany))

Abstract

Assessing the effects of monetary policy and wage bargaining on employment andinflation in the European Monetary Union (EMU), the first step sees development of a Post-Keynesian competitive claims model of inflation with endogenous money. In this model the NAIRU is considered to be a short-run limit to employment enforced by independent and conservative central banks. In the long run, however, the NAIRU will follow actual unemployment and is therefore also dependent on the forces determining aggregate demand, including monetary policies. But the NAIRU may also be reduced through effectively co-ordinated wage bargaining, as has been shown by institutional political economists. Applying these considerations to the economic performance of the EMU, different scenarios determined by wage bargainingcoordination and the European Central Bank's (ECB) monetary policies are developed. It is shown that the first phase of the EMU was dominated by uncoordinated wage bargaining across the EMU and an "anti-growth-bias" of theECB. Thus the euro area was plagued with nominal wage restraint, highunemployment and inflation above the ECB target. Economic performance will improve if the ECB abandons its asymmetric monetary strategy. This may be facilitated by a higher degree of effective wage bargaining co-ordination across the EMU.

Suggested Citation

  • Eckhard Hein, 2002. "Monetary policy and wage bargaining in the EMU: restrictive ECB policies, high unemployment, nominal wage restraint and inflation above the target," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 55(222), pages 299-337.
  • Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:2002:33
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Detzer & Eckhard Hein, 2014. "Finance-dominated capitalism in Germany – deep recession and quick recovery," Working papers wpaper54, Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Project.
    2. Jesús Ferreiro & Carmen Gómez, 2014. "Implementing a Voluntary Wage Policy: Lessons from the Irish and Spanish Wages Policies before the Crisis," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 61(1), pages 107-127, Februar.
    3. Eckhard Hein & Achim Truger, 2014. "Fiscal Policy and Rebalancing in the Euro Area: A Critique of the German Debt Brake from a Post-Keynesian Perspective," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 61(1), pages 21-38, Februar.
    4. Herr, Hansjörg, 2013. "An analytical framework for the Post-Keynesian macroeconomic paradigm," IPE Working Papers 23/2013, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE).
    5. Hein, Eckhard & Truger, Achim, 2005. "European Monetary Union: nominal convergence, real divergence and slow growth?," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 7-33, March.
    6. Eckhard Hein & Christian Schoder, 2011. "Interest rates, distribution and capital accumulation -- A post-Kaleckian perspective on the US and Germany," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(6), pages 693-723, November.
    7. Hein, Eckhard & Truger, Achim, 2004. "What ever happened to Germany? Is the decline of the former European key currency country caused by structural sclerosis or macroeconomic mismanagement?," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 134, Darmstadt University of Technology, Department of Law and Economics.
    8. repec:mes:postke:v:35:y:2012:i:2:p:187-213 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Hein, Eckhard & Dodig, Nina & Budyldina, Natalia, 2014. "Financial, economic and social systems: French Regulation School, Social Structures of Accumulation and Post-Keynesian approaches compared," IPE Working Papers 34/2014, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE).
    10. Eckhard Hein & Achim Truger, 2012. "Finance-dominated capitalism in crisis—the case for a global Keynesian New Deal," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(2), pages 187-213.
    11. Eckhard Hein & Daniel Detzer, 2014. "Coping with imbalances in the Euro area: Policy alternatives addressing divergences and disparities between member countries," Working papers wpaper63, Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Project.
    12. Detzer, Daniel & Hein, Eckhard, 2014. "Financialisation and the financial and economic crises: The case of Germany," IPE Working Papers 44/2014, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE).
    13. Hein, Eckhard & Truger, Achim, 2013. "Future fiscal and debt policies: Germany in the Context of the European Monetary Union," IPE Working Papers 24/2013, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE).
    14. Achim Truger, 2013. "Steuerpolitik im Dienste der Umverteilung: eine makroökonomische Ergänzung," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 82(1), pages 43-59.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; EMU; European Monetary Union; Inflation; Monetary Policy; Monetary Union; Monetary; Money; Policy; Union; Wage Bargaining; Wage;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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