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Bad Banks — Good Bank Resolution?

Author

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  • Mark Wahrenburg

    (Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, House of Finance)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag beschreibt privatwirtschaftliche und staatHche Erscheinungsformen von Bad Banks und ordnet diese in das Spektrum der bankenrettungsinstrumente ein. Nach einer Diskussion der mit Bad Banks verfolgten Zielsetzungen werden die in der Praxis beobachteten bad bank Varianten verglichen. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf den im Zuge der Finanzmarktkrise in Deutschland und uSA umgesetzten bad bank Lösungen. Mit Hilfe eines einfachen Modells wird untersucht, welchen beitrag bad banks zur Lösung der als «Moral Hazard» bekannten Tendenz zur Übernahme exzessiver Risiken durch insolvenzgefährdete banken leisten.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Wahrenburg, 2013. "Bad Banks — Good Bank Resolution?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 65(67), pages 42-71, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:65:y:2013:i:67:d:10.1007_bf03373022
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03373022
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bad bank; Bank resolution; Bail out; Banking Crisis; Moral Hazard in banking; Bankenrettung; Bankenkrise; Moral Hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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