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Games of fixed rank: a hierarchy of bimatrix games

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  • Ravi Kannan

  • Thorsten Theobald

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Suggested Citation

  • Ravi Kannan & Thorsten Theobald, 2010. "Games of fixed rank: a hierarchy of bimatrix games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(1), pages 157-173, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:42:y:2010:i:1:p:157-173
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0436-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin, 2006. "Matching and Price Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 652-668, June.
    2. Quint, Thomas & Shubik, Martin, 2002. "A bound on the number of Nash equilibria in a coordination game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 323-327, November.
    3. McLennan, Andrew & Park, In-Uck, 1999. "Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 111-130, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bernhard Stengel, 2010. "Computation of Nash equilibria in finite games: introduction to the symposium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(1), pages 1-7, January.
    2. Bharat Adsul & Jugal Garg & Ruta Mehta & Milind Sohoni & Bernhard von Stengel, 2021. "Fast Algorithms for Rank-1 Bimatrix Games," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 613-631, March.
    3. M. Punniyamoorthy & Sarin Abraham & Jose Joy Thoppan, 2023. "A Method to Select Best Among Multi-Nash Equilibria," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 11(1), pages 101-127, April.
    4. Constantin Ickstadt & Thorsten Theobald & Elias Tsigaridas, 2024. "Semidefinite games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(3), pages 827-857, September.
    5. Ozan Candogan & Ishai Menache & Asuman Ozdaglar & Pablo A. Parrilo, 2011. "Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 36(3), pages 474-503, August.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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