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Games of fixed rank: a hierarchy of bimatrix games


  • Ravi Kannan


  • Thorsten Theobald



No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Ravi Kannan & Thorsten Theobald, 2010. "Games of fixed rank: a hierarchy of bimatrix games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(1), pages 157-173, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:42:y:2010:i:1:p:157-173 DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0436-2

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin, 2006. "Matching and Price Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 652-668, June.
    2. Quint, Thomas & Shubik, Martin, 2002. "A bound on the number of Nash equilibria in a coordination game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 323-327, November.
    3. McLennan, Andrew & Park, In-Uck, 1999. "Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 111-130, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bernhard Stengel, 2010. "Computation of Nash equilibria in finite games: introduction to the symposium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(1), pages 1-7, January.

    More about this item


    Bimarix game; Nash equilibrium; Fixed rank; Approximation; C63; C72;

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games


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