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Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage Offers

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  • Kohei Kawamura
  • József Sákovics

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="sjpe12054-abs-0001"> We analyse a labour-matching model with wage posting, where – reflecting institutional constraints – firms cannot differentiate their wage offers within certain subsets of workers. Inter alia, we find that the presence of impersonal wage offers leads to wage compression, which propagates to the wages for high productivity workers who receive personalized offers.

Suggested Citation

  • Kohei Kawamura & József Sákovics, 2014. "Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage Offers," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 61(5), pages 487-501, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:61:y:2014:i:5:p:487-501
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/sjpe.2014.61.issue-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vera Brenčič, 2012. "Wage posting: evidence from job ads," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1529-1559, November.
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    6. Alcalde, Jose & Perez-Castrillo, David & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 1998. "Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 469-480, October.
    7. Robert E. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, 2012. "Evidence on the Incidence of Wage Posting, Wage Bargaining, and On-the-Job Search," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 56-67, October.
    8. Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin, 2006. "Matching and Price Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 652-668, June.
    9. Konishi, Hideo & Sapozhnikov, Margarita, 2008. "Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 193-218, September.
    10. Vera Brenčič, 2012. "Wage posting: evidence from job ads," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1529-1559, November.
    11. Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry, 2013. "Pricing and investments in matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    12. Azevedo, Eduardo M., 2014. "Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 207-223.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sákovics, József, 2014. "Price formation in a matching market with targeted offers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 161-177.

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