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The zecca mint: a self-enforcing monetary constitution in historic venice

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  • Rania Adel Al-Bawwab

    (Middle Tennessee State University)

Abstract

Monetary history is largely a repeated narrative of currency debasement. Yet historic Venice (1172–1797), ruled by elite patricians, stands out as an example of relative monetary stability. This paper provides a historical case of Venice’s Zecca Mint which provided the elite patricians of Venice with a stable currency, playing a role in fostering the economic success of the Republic of Venice. This paper identifies three factors that together formed a self-enforcing monetary constitution to inhibit public currency debasement in historic Venice: (i) the assignment of public debt to patricians, (ii) the nearly uniform trade-centric focus of the patricians and (iii) the use of turn-taking in office for mintmasters.

Suggested Citation

  • Rania Adel Al-Bawwab, 2022. "The zecca mint: a self-enforcing monetary constitution in historic venice," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-15, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:23:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s10101-021-00260-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-021-00260-z
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