Developments in differential game theory and numerical methods: economic and management applications
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- Parilina, Elena & Sedakov, Artem & Zaccour, Georges, 2017. "Price of anarchy in a linear-state stochastic dynamic game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 258(2), pages 790-800.
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KeywordsDifferential game theory; Economics; Management; Numerical methods;
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