A Differential Game Model of Tariff War
We present a simple two(-country) by two(-good) differental game model of international trade in which the governments of the two countries play a tariff-setting game. We explicitly derive a unilateral optimum tarifff rate and then a Markov-perfect equilibrium pair of tariff strategies (bilateral optimum tariff strategies) and compare the welfare level of each country among autarchic, free-trade, unilateral and bilateral optimum-tariff equilibria.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2000|
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- Léonard,Daniel & Long,Ngo van, 1992.
"Optimal Control Theory and Static Optimization in Economics,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521331586, November.
- Léonard,Daniel & Long,Ngo van, 1992. "Optimal Control Theory and Static Optimization in Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521337465, November.
- Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, November.
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