A Class Of Performance-Based Subsidy Rules
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Other versions of this item:
- Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 2004. "Designing a Performance Indicator to Economize on Monopoly Subsidy," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-08, CIRANO.
- Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 2007. "A Class Of Performance-Based Subsidy Rules," Departmental Working Papers 2007-05, McGill University, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Daubanes, Julien, 2011.
"Optimal taxation of a monopolistic extractor: Are subsidies necessary?,"
Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 399-403, May.
- Julien Daubanes, 2008. "Optimal taxation of a monopolistic extractor: are subsidies necessary?," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 08/92, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
More about this item
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
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