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Argumentation in Foreign Policy Settings

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  • Robert Axelrod

    (Department of Political Science and Institute of Public Policy Studies University of Michigan)

Abstract

This is a study of argumentation in three different kinds of high level, confidential, foreign policy settings: a collegial setting, a bureaucratic setting, and a bargaining setting. The causal and value assertions of the participants were coded using the detailed records of these three settings. The data show to be inadequate a defense/ attack model of argumentation in which the participants support their own arguments to make them resistant to attack, while attacking the weak spots in others'stated positions. In fact, there are few assertions which are supported by specific evidence, almost no mutually supported causal arguments, and the assertions which were attacked were no less emphasized than the assertions which were not attacked. More in accord with the data is the novel-arguments approach in which the key factor in persuasive argumentation is the development of arguments which others have not already taken into account.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Axelrod, 1977. "Argumentation in Foreign Policy Settings," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(4), pages 727-756, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:21:y:1977:i:4:p:727-756
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277702100410
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ariel Levi & Philip E. Tetlock, 1980. "A Cognitive Analysis of Japan's 1941 Decision for War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(2), pages 195-211, June.
    2. Wellman, Michael P., 1994. "Inference in cognitive maps," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 137-148.

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