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Do Peripheral Workers Do Peripheral Work? Comparing the Use of Highly Skilled Contractors and Regular Employees

Author

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  • Matthew Bidwell

Abstract

This paper uses data from a 2002 survey of project managers in a large, U.S.-based financial services institution to compare how contractors and regular employees were assigned to work within an information technology department. The author uses these data to test standard core-periphery arguments about the use of contingent workers, as well as accounts of contingent work that emphasize the interests of frontline managers. He finds that contractors and employees were used very similarly in most respects, although there were some differences. Contractors were less likely to be used in roles that were more critical to the firm, but more likely to be used when frontline managers' interests could conflict with the organization's. Contractors were also less likely to be given positions requiring knowledge of the business. No evidence is found, however, that other kinds of firm-specific skills affected how contractors were used.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Bidwell, 2009. "Do Peripheral Workers Do Peripheral Work? Comparing the Use of Highly Skilled Contractors and Regular Employees," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 62(2), pages 200-225, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:62:y:2009:i:2:p:200-225
    DOI: 10.1177/001979390906200204
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew J. Bidwell, 2012. "Politics and Firm Boundaries: How Organizational Structure, Group Interests, and Resources Affect Outsourcing," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(6), pages 1622-1642, December.
    2. Matthew Bidwell, 2010. "Problems Deciding: How the Structure of Make-or-Buy Decisions Leads to Transaction Misalignment," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 21(2), pages 362-379, April.
    3. Kozica, Arjan & Kaiser, Stephan, 2012. "A Sustainability Perspective on Flexible HRM: How to Cope with Paradoxes of Contingent Work," management revue - Socio-Economic Studies, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 23(3), pages 239-261.
    4. Rory Donnelly, 2011. "The Organization of Working Time in the Knowledge Economy: An Insight into the Working Time Patterns of Consultants in the UK and the USA," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 49(Supplemen), pages 93-114, June.
    5. Adam Seth Litwin, 2011. "Technological Change at Work: The Impact of Employee Involvement on the Effectiveness of Health Information Technology," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 64(5), pages 863-888, October.

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