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The Effect of Unions on the Receipt of Unemployment Insurance Benefits

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  • John W. Budd
  • Brian P. McCall

Abstract

Using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data for 1979–91, the authors analyze the effect of union representation on the likelihood that individuals eligible for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits actually received those benefits. They find that unions had no statistically significant effect on the probability of benefit receipt among white-collar workers, but among eligible blue-collar workers, those who were laid off from union jobs were roughly 23% more likely than comparable nonunion workers to receive UI benefits. Although the analysis does not identify the reasons for this difference, two factors it appears to rule out as determinants are union-negotiated supplemental unemployment benefit plans and differences between union and nonunion workers in expected unemployment duration.

Suggested Citation

  • John W. Budd & Brian P. McCall, 1997. "The Effect of Unions on the Receipt of Unemployment Insurance Benefits," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(3), pages 478-492, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:50:y:1997:i:3:p:478-492
    DOI: 10.1177/001979399705000306
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rebecca Blank & David Card, 1988. "Recent Trends in Insured and Uninsured Unemployment: Is There an Explanation?," Working Papers 623, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
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    5. Butler, Richard J & Worrall, John D, 1983. "Workers' Compensation: Benefit and Injury Claims Rates in the Seventies," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(4), pages 580-589, November.
    6. Devine, Theresa J. & Kiefer, Nicolas M., 1991. "Empirical Labor Economics: The Search Approach," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195059366, Decembrie.
    7. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, 1993. "Union Membership and Coverage Files from the Current Population Surveys: Note," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 46(3), pages 574-578, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Avraham Ebenstein & Kevin Stange, 2010. "Does inconvenience explain low take-up? Evidence from unemployment insurance," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(1), pages 111-136.
    2. Chikako Oka, 2016. "Improving working conditions in garment supply chains: The role of unions in Cambodia," Post-Print hal-02952169, HAL.
    3. Iuliia Shybalkina, 2021. "The role of organized groups in administrative burdens of property taxation," Journal of Behavioral Public Administration, Center for Experimental and Behavioral Public Administration, vol. 4(1).
    4. John W. Budd, 2010. "Does Employee Ignorance Undermine Shared Capitalism?," NBER Chapters, in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 291-316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Chang Hee Lee & Mingwei Liu, 2011. "Collective Bargaining in Transition: Measuring the Effects of Collective Voice in China," Chapters, in: Susan Hayter (ed.), The Role of Collective Bargaining in the Global Economy, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Dionne Pohler & Chris Riddell, 2019. "Multinationals’ Compliance with Employment Law: An Empirical Assessment Using Administrative Data from Ontario, 2004 to 2015," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 72(3), pages 606-635, May.
    7. Sojourner, Aaron & Yang, Jooyoung, 2015. "Effects of Unionization on Workplace-Safety Enforcement: Regression-Discontinuity Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 9610, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Chikako Oka, 2016. "Improving Working Conditions in Garment Supply Chains: The Role of Unions in Cambodia," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 54(3), pages 647-672, September.
    9. David Weil, 2003. "Individual Rights and Collective Agents: The Role of Old and New Workplace Institutions in the Regulation of Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 9565, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Marta Lachowska & Isaac Sorkin & Stephen A. Woodbury, 2022. "Firms and Unemployment Insurance Take-Up," Upjohn Working Papers 22-369, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    11. Héctor Gutiérrez Rufrancos, 2019. "Are There Gains to Joining a Union? Evidence from Mexico," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 57(3), pages 676-712, September.
    12. Lu, Yi & Tao, Zhigang & Wang, Yijiang, 2010. "Union effects on performance and employment relations: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 202-210, March.
    13. David Weil, 2004. "Individual Rights and Collective Agents. The Role of Old and New Workplace Institutions in the Regulation of Labor Markets," NBER Chapters, in: Emerging Labor Market Institutions for the Twenty-First Century, pages 13-44, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Morris M. Kleiner & David Weil, 2010. "Evaluating the Effectiveness of National Labor Relations Act Remedies: Analysis and Comparison with Other Workplace Penalty Policies," NBER Working Papers 16626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Marc Chan & Marios Michaelides & Sisi Zhang, 2014. "Who Receives Unemployment Insurance?," Research in Applied Economics, Macrothink Institute, vol. 6(3), pages 98-128, September.
    16. Aaron Sojourner & Jooyoung Yang, 2022. "Effects of Union Certification on Workplace-Safety Enforcement: Regression-Discontinuity Evidence," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 75(2), pages 373-401, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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