Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Generate Information
Firms that maintain no formal record of actions and events would hardly be considered well managed. Yet, organizations that require the recording of actions and the filing of reports are often labelled ``bureaucratic" and inefficient. We argue that the thin line between efficient management practices and inefficient bureaucracy is crossed to curb managerial agency costs in a multilayer hierarchy. The model predicts that bureaucracy increases with the frequency of managerial turnover, and it establishes a link between bureaucracy, incentive schemes, and leverage in a cross-section of firms.
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Volume (Year): 35 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
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