IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Banks, distances, and financing constraints for firms

  • Pietro Alessandrini
  • Andrea F. Presbitero
  • Alberto Zazzaro

The wave of bank mergers and acquisitions experienced in European and U.S. credit markets during the Nineties has deeply changed the geography of banking industry. While the number of bank branches has increased in almost every country, reducing the operational distance between banks and borrowers, bank decisional centres and strategic functions have been concentrated in only a few places within each nation, increasing the functional distance between banks and local communities. In this paper, we carry out a multivariate analysis to assess the correlation of functional and operational distances with local borrowers' financing constraints. We apply our analysis on Italian data at the local market level defined as provinces. Our findings consistently show that increased functional distance makes financing constraints more binding, it being positively associated with the probability of firms being rationed, investment-cash flow sensitivity, and the ratio of credit lines utilized by borrowers to credit lines make available by banks. These adverse effects are particularly evident for small firms and for firms located in southern Italian provinces. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the negative impact on financing constraints following the actual increased functional distance over the period 1996-2003 has substantially offset (and sometimes exceeded) the beneficial effects of the increased diffusion of bank branches occurring during the same period.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its series Proceedings with number 1053.

as
in new window

Length: 205-232
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (2007: 43rd) ; The Mixing of Banking & Commerce
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhpr:1053
Contact details of provider: Postal: P.O. Box 834, 230 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois 60690-0834
Phone: 312/322-5111
Fax: 312/322-5515
Web page: http://www.chicagofed.org/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/print_publication_order_form.cfm Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Collender, Robert N. & Shaffer, Sherrill L., 2000. "Local Bank Office Ownership, Deposit Control, Market Structure, And Economic Growth," Technical Bulletins 33555, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
  2. Pietro Alessandrini & Manuela Croci & Alberto Zazzaro, 2005. "The geography of banking power: role of function distance," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 58(235), pages 129-167.
  3. Palley, Thomas I., 1997. "Managerial turnover and the theory of short-termism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 547-557, April.
  4. Goldberg, Lawrence G. & White, Lawrence J., 1998. "De novo banks and lending to small businesses: An empirical analysis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 851-867, August.
  5. Allen N. Berger & Robert De Young, 2001. "The effects of geographic expansion on bank efficiency," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-03, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  6. Magda Bianco & Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2001. "Courts and Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement on Credit Markets," CSEF Working Papers 58, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 09 Apr 2002.
  7. Gehrig, Thomas, 1998. "Screening, cross-border banking, and the allocation of credit," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 387-407, December.
  8. Steven N. Kaplan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities are not Valid Measures of Financing Constraints," NBER Working Papers 7659, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Benfratello, Luigi & Schiantarelli, Fabio & Sembenelli, Alessandro, 2008. "Banks and innovation: Microeconometric evidence on Italian firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 197-217, November.
  10. Alberto ZAZZARO, 2001. "The Allocation of Entrepreneurial Talent under Imeperfect Lending Decisions," Working Papers 157, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
  11. Novaes, Walter & Zingales, Luigi, 2003. "Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Generate Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3945, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Udell, Gregory F., 1989. "Loan quality, commercial loan review and loan officer contracting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 367-382, July.
  13. Alberto Zazzaro, 2005. "Should Courts Enforce Credit Contracts Strictly?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(500), pages 166-184, 01.
  14. Guiso, Luigi, 1998. "High-tech firms and credit rationing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 39-59, March.
  15. Kaplan, Steven N & Zingales, Luigi, 1997. "Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 169-215, February.
  16. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Sherril Shaffer, 1997. "The winner's curse in banking," Working Papers 97-25, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  18. Carling, Kenneth & Lundberg, Sofia, 2005. "Asymmetric information and distance: an empirical assessment of geographical credit rationing," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 39-59.
  19. Allen N. Berger & Nathan H. Miller & Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan & Jeremy C. Stein, 2002. "Does Function Follow Organzizational Form? Evidence From the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1976, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  20. Brian Uzzi & Ryon Lancaster, 2003. "Relational Embeddedness and Learning: The Case of Bank Loan Managers and Their Clients," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(4), pages 383-399, April.
  21. Pietro Alessandrini & Luca Papi & Alberto Zazzaro, 2003. "Banks, regions and development," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 56(224), pages 23-55.
  22. Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti & Giovanni Dell & Ariccia#x2019, 2000. "Bank Competition and Firm Creation," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-20, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  23. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Scholarly Articles 4554125, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  24. Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2000. "Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending," NBER Working Papers 7685, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric S., 1998. "Bank consolidation and small business lending: It's not just bank size that matters," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 799-819, August.
  26. Angelini, P. & Di Salvo, R. & Ferri, G., 1998. "Availability and cost of credit for small businesses: Customer relationships and credit cooperatives," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 925-954, August.
  27. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 2001. "Small business credit availability and relationship lending: the importance of bank organizational structure," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-36, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  28. Richard Blundell & Steve Bond, 1995. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," IFS Working Papers W95/17, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  29. Bonaccorsi di Patti, Emilia & Gobbi, Giorgio, 2001. "The changing structure of local credit markets: Are small businesses special?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(12), pages 2209-2237, December.
  30. Guiso, Luigi & Sapienza, Paola & Zingales, Luigi, 2000. "The Role of Social Capital In Financial Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 2383, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  31. Paul R. Milgrom., 1987. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design," Economics Working Papers 8741, University of California at Berkeley.
  32. Jose Maria Liberti, 2004. "Initiative, Incentives and Soft Information. How Does Delegation Impact The Role of Bank Relationship Managers?," Finance 0404023, EconWPA.
  33. Jeremy C. Stein, 2002. "Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized versus Hierarchical Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 1891-1921, October.
  34. Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Marquez, Robert, 2004. "Information and bank credit allocation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 185-214, April.
  35. David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 1997. "The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment," NBER Working Papers 5969, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  36. Strahan, Philip E. & Weston, James P., 1998. "Small business lending and the changing structure of the banking industry1," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 821-845, August.
  37. Arellano, Manuel & Bond, Stephen, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 277-97, April.
  38. Richard J. Sullivan & Kenneth Spong, 1995. "Successful strategies in interstate bank acquisitions," Financial Industry Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Dec, pages 21-37.
  39. Andreas Roider, 2006. "Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)Complete Contract," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(3), pages 391-411, September.
  40. Hans Degryse & Steven Ongena, 2002. "Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition," CSEF Working Papers 80, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  41. Steven M. Fazzari & R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Petersen, 2000. "Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Are Useful: A Comment On Kaplan And Zingales," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 695-705, May.
  42. Pietro Alessandrini & Alberto Zazzaro, 1998. "A 'possibilist' approach to regional banking systems and financial integration: The Italian experience," ERSA conference papers ersa98p132, European Regional Science Association.
  43. Focarelli, Dario & Panetta, Fabio & Salleo, Carmelo, 2002. "Why Do Banks Merge?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(4), pages 1047-66, November.
  44. Paola Sapienza, 2002. "The Effects of Banking Mergers on Loan Contracts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 329-367, 02.
  45. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
  46. Allen N. Berger & Rebecca S. Demsetz & Philip E. Strahan, 1998. "The consolidation of the financial services industry: causes, consequences, and implications for the future," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-46, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  47. Pietro ALESSANDRINI & Giorgio CALCAGNINI & Alberto ZAZZARO, 2006. "Asset Restructuring Strategies in Bank Acquisitions: Evidence from the Italian Banking Industry," Working Papers 264, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
  48. Elsas, Ralf, 2005. "Empirical determinants of relationship lending," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 32-57, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedhpr:1053. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bernie Flores)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.