Analyse des liens entre les départs de dirigeants suite à une mauvaise performance et la création de valeur: une étude menée en France
(VF)L'objectif de l'article est de tester sur une période récente si les changements de dirigeants, suite à une mauvaise performance en France, ont permis aux firmes un retour à de meilleurs résultats. L'étude empirique, menée sur un échantillon de 160 sociétés cotées à Paris ayant changé de dirigeant entre 1996 et 2004, confirme un effet positif sur la création de valeur des départs de dirigeants dans ce contexte si le successeur est un externe, ou si la firme est contrôlée. La réflexion doit être prolongée pour mieux comprendre sous quelles conditions ces départs permettent un retour à de meilleurs résultats.(VA)This article examines the value creation related to CEO departures in the context of poor performing French corporations. The empirical tests conducted on a sample of 160 firms listed on the Paris stock exchange whose CEOs were replaced between 1996 and 2004 give evidence of the positive effect of these departures on firm performance when the successor is an outsider or when firms are controlled. Additional factors should ultimately be analyzed to better understand in which cases CEO departures in the context of poor performance involve value creation.
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