IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Les limites du cadre institutionnel européen

  • Menguy, Séverine

    (EconomiX)

Registered author(s):

    This paper propounds a revue of literature about the limits of the current European institutional framework. First, it appears that the status of the European Central Bank, and particularly its quasi exclusive aim to maintain the stability of prices, don’t ease the possibilities of harmonization of the budgetary policies between the member countries. Then, the institutional coordination of the budgetary policies seems nowadays insufficiently developed in Europe. Moreover, the constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact are too much static: they undervalue the importance of the level of the public debt, and they impose the same norm of public deficits to countries which situations and budgetary expenditures are very heterogeneous. Finally, the budgetary constraints should better be related only to the structural part of the public deficits, and they should be made more symmetric in the different phases of the economic cycle. But the reform of the Pact which took place in March 2005 does only bring imperfect answers to some of these limits. Cet article propose une revue de la littérature des limites du cadre institutionnel actuel de l’Union européenne. Tout d’abord, il apparaît que les statuts de la Banque centrale européenne, et en particulier son objectif quasi exclusif de maintien de la stabilité des prix, ne facilitent pas les possibilités d’harmonisation des politiques budgétaires entre les pays membres. Ensuite, la coordination budgétaire institutionnelle semble encore insuffisamment développée en Europe. De plus, les contraintes imposées par le Pacte de stabilité et de croissance sont trop statiques : elles sous-valorisent le critère de dette publique et imposent des normes uniformes à des pays dont les situations et les dépenses publiques sont très hétérogènes. Enfin, il serait préférable que ces contraintes portent seulement sur la part structurelle des déficits publics et comportent davantage de symétrie dans les différentes phases du cycle économique. Or, la réforme du Pacte intervenue en mars 2005 n’apporte que des réponses imparfaites à certaines de ces limites.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/014920ar
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

    Volume (Year): 82 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 3 (septembre)
    Pages: 395-418

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:82:y:2006:i:3:p:395-418
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.scse.ca/
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Petra M. Geraats, 2001. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Macroeconomics 0012011, EconWPA.
    2. Willem H. Buiter, 1999. "Alice in Euroland," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 181-209, 06.
    3. Jeffery D. Amato & Hyun Song Shin & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Communication and monetary policy," BIS Working Papers 123, Bank for International Settlements.
    4. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1998. "The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 65-113, 04.
    5. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco & Tesfaselassie, Mewael F., 2004. "Central Bank Communication and Output Stabilization," CEPR Discussion Papers 4408, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Jérôme Creel, 2003. "Ranking Fiscal Policy Rules: the Golden Rule of Public Finance vs. the Stability and Growth Pact," Sciences Po publications 2003-04, Sciences Po.
    7. Coenen Günter & Orphanides Athanasios & Wieland Volker, 2004. "Price Stability and Monetary Policy Effectiveness when Nominal Interest Rates are Bounded at Zero," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-25, February.
    8. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Robert E. Cumby & Behzad T. Diba, 2002. "Should the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve be concerned about fiscal policy?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 333-389.
    9. Buti, Marco & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Franco, Daniele, 2003. "Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: Grand Design or Internal Adjustment?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3692, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Cukierman, A., 2000. "Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem," Papers 2000-4, Tel Aviv.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:82:y:2006:i:3:p:395-418. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruce Shearer)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.