The US Social Security System: What Does Political Sustainability Imply?
This paper examines how political constraints can shape the social security system under different demographics. A steady state mapping between relevant economic and demographic variables and the social security tax rate resulting from a majority voting is provided. I calibrate an OLG model to the US economy. Calculations using Census population and survival probabilities projections, and 1961-96 labor productivity growth deliver a social security tax rate of 13.3% (currently 11.2%), and a 54% replacement ratio (51.7%). This result reflects the median voter's aging, from 44 to 46 years, which dominates the decrease in the dependency ratio, from 5.45 to 4.72. (Copyright: Elsevier)
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Volume (Year): 2 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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