Constitutional “Rules” and Intergenerational Fiscal Policy
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References listed on IDEAS
- Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X, 1996. "A Positive Theory of Social Security," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 277-304, June.
- Thomas F. Cooley & Jorge Soares, 1999. "A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 135-160, February.
- Costas Azariadis & Vincenzo Galasso, 1996. "Discretion, rules and volatility," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 65-74.
- Esteban Joan Maria & Sakovics Jozsef, 1993. "Intertemporal Transfer Institutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 189-205, December.
- Galasso, Vincenzo & Azariadis, Costas, 1997. "Fiscal constitutions and the determinacy of intergenerational transfers," UC3M Working papers. Economics 6066, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- BOLDRIN, Michele & RUSTICHINI, Aldo, 1994. "Equilibria with Social Security," CORE Discussion Papers 1994060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-677, September.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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- Andreas Wagener, 2002. "Intergenerational Transfer Schemes as Incomplete Social Contracts," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 337-359, December.
- Martin Kolmar, 2000. "Constitutions as Commitment or Coordination Device? Comment on C. Azariadis and V. Galasso: Constitutional “Rules” and Intergenerational Fiscal Policy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 371-374, December.
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