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Capital Taxation under Political Constraints

Author

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  • Florian Scheuer
  • Alexander Wolitzky

Abstract

This paper studies optimal dynamic tax policy under the threat of political reform. A policy will be reformed ex post if a large enough coalition of citizens supports reform; thus, sustainable policies are those that will continue to attract enough political support in the future. We find that optimal marginal capital taxes are either progressive or U-shaped, so that savings are subsidized for the poor and/or the middle class but are taxed for the rich. U-shaped capital taxes always emerge when individuals' political behavior is purely determined by economic motives.

Suggested Citation

  • Florian Scheuer & Alexander Wolitzky, 2016. "Capital Taxation under Political Constraints," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(8), pages 2304-2328, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:8:p:2304-28
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141081
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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