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Workers' Skills and Product Selection

Author

Listed:
  • Jean Gabszewicz
  • Alessandro Turrini

Abstract

[fre] Qualification de travailleurs et sélection de produits. . La production d'un bien de qualité supérieure requiert l'utilisation de travailleurs spécialement qualifiés à cette fin. Quand les firmes doivent choisir la qualité des biens qu' elles se proposent de produire et de vendre, leur choix dépend de l'abon­dance de travail qualifié offert sur le marché du travail. Nous analysons, dans cet article, comment s'opère la sélection de la qualité des produits par un monopole et en concurrence, en fonction de l'offre de travail qualifié. Nous démontrons que l'existence d'un pouvoir de marché introduit un biais par rapport à la solution concurrentielle, en faveur d'une qualité moyenne trop élevée. [eng] Workers' Skills and Product Selection. . When the production of high quality goods needs the employment of qualified labour, firms' decisions concerning quality are affected by the extent to which skills are abundant. By means of a comparison between monopoly and perfect compe­tition, we show how market power in such a context may entail a distorsion in product selection towards too high average quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Gabszewicz & Alessandro Turrini, 1999. "Workers' Skills and Product Selection," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 50(3), pages 383-391.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1999_num_50_3_410083
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lawrence M. Kahn, 2007. "Sports League Expansion and Consumer Welfare," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 8(2), pages 115-138, May.
    2. Emanuele Bacchiega & Antonio Minniti, 2015. "Training and Product Quality in Unionized Oligopolies," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 82, pages 1261-1301, December.
    3. Marisa Cenci & Margherita Scarlato, 2002. "Istituzioni e mercato del lavoro nel Mezzogiorno d’Italia: un’analisi dinamica," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 92(3), pages 281-320, May-June.
    4. Hend Ghazzai & Wided Hemissi & Rim Lahmandi-Ayed & Sana Kefi, 2020. "A Note on Democracy and Competition: The Role of Ownership Structure in a General Equilibrium Model with Vertical Preferences," Working Papers hal-02480175, HAL.
    5. Bilanakos, Christos & Heywood, John S. & Sessions, John & Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos, 2018. "Does demand for product quality increase worker training?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 159-177.
    6. Emanuele Bacchiega, 2007. "Wage bargaining and vertical differentiation," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 54(1), pages 35-52, March.
    7. Amani Kahloul & Rim Lahmandi-Ayed & Hejer Lasram & Didier Laussel, 2017. "Democracy and competition: Vertical differentiation and labor in a general equilibrium model," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(4), pages 860-874, August.
    8. BACCHIEGA, Emanuele, 2004. "Vertical differentiation, wage bargaining and intra-industry trade liberalization," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2004028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    9. Hend Ghazzai & Wided Hemissi & Rim Lahmandi-Ayed & Sana Mami Kefi, 2021. "Note on Democracy and Competition: The Role of Ownership Structure in a General Equilibrium Model with Vertical Preferences," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 131(2), pages 249-261.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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