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Note on Democracy and Competition: The Role of Ownership Structure in a General Equilibrium Model with Vertical Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Hend Ghazzai
  • Wided Hemissi
  • Rim Lahmandi-Ayed
  • Sana Mami Kefi

Abstract

This note considers a general equilibrium model where individuals are potentially consumers, workers, and shareholders. It extends the results obtained previously by Kahloul et al. [2017] with extreme ownership structures on the majority vote between Monopoly and Duopoly, to the case of any proportion of shareholders in the population. We prove that Duopoly is preferred when non-shareholders constitute a majority of the population. Otherwise, the majority vote depends on the proportion of shareholders and the dispersion of the individuals with respect to their intensity of preference for quality relative to their sensitivity to effort. JEL Classification: D7, L13

Suggested Citation

  • Hend Ghazzai & Wided Hemissi & Rim Lahmandi-Ayed & Sana Mami Kefi, 2021. "Note on Democracy and Competition: The Role of Ownership Structure in a General Equilibrium Model with Vertical Preferences," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 131(2), pages 249-261.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_312_0081
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    Cited by:

    1. Hend Ghazzai & Wided Hemissi & Rim Lahmandi‐Ayed & Sana Mami Kefi, 2023. "More competition to alleviate poverty? A general equilibrium model and an empirical study," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(5), pages 985-1011, October.

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    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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