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Wage bargaining and vertical differentiation

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  • BACCHIEGA, Emanuele

Abstract

This article intends to apply the Nash Bargaining solution to wage setting in a vertically differentiated oligopoly and to study its welfare effects. The market outcome crucially depends on the bargaining power attributed to the agents. I show that the resulting wage bargaining structure is likely to lead to another source of distortion that adds to the classical one derived by oligopoly pricing and quality choice.

Suggested Citation

  • BACCHIEGA, Emanuele, 2002. "Wage bargaining and vertical differentiation," CORE Discussion Papers 2002076, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2002076
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1988. "Unionized oligopoly and international trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3-4), pages 217-234, May.
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    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. Webster, Allan, 1993. "The Skill and Higher Educational Content of UK Net Exports," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 55(2), pages 141-159, May.
    6. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier.
    7. Jean Gabszewicz & Alessandro Turrini, 1999. "Workers' Skills and Product Selection," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 50(3), pages 383-391.
    8. Dhillon, Amrita & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2002. "A generalised wage rigidity result," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 285-311, March.
    9. Dowrick, Steve, 1989. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(398), pages 1123-1142, December.
    10. Joan Martín-Montaner & Vicente Ríos, 2002. "Vertical specialization and intra-industry trade: The role of factor endowments," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 138(2), pages 340-365, June.
    11. Naylor, Robin, 1998. "International trade and economic integration when labour markets are generally unionised," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1251-1267, July.
    12. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    13. Coles, Melvyn G & Hildreth, Andrew, 1996. "Wage Bargaining, Inventories, and Union Legislation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1361, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. BOCCARD, Nicolas & WAUTHY, Xavier, 2009. "Regulating quality by regulating quantity : a case against minimum quality standards," CORE Discussion Papers 2009052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    15. Aoki, Reiko & Prusa, Thomas J., 1997. "Sequential versus simultaneous choice with endogenous quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 103-121, February.
    16. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Minas Vlassis & Maria Varvataki, 2014. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Vertical Differentiation: Do Unions Affect Quality? Dynamic Analysis," Working Papers 1410, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    2. Emanuele Bacchiega & Antonio Minniti, 2015. "Training and Product Quality in Unionized Oligopolies," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 82, pages 1261-1301, December.
    3. BACCHIEGA, Emanuele, 2004. "Vertical differentiation, wage bargaining and intra-industry trade liberalization," CORE Discussion Papers 2004028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Bacchiega, Emanuele & Randon, Emanuela & Zirulia, Lorenzo, 2012. "Strategic accessibility competition," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 195-212.
    5. António Brandão & Joana Pinho, 2016. "Productivity shocks in a union-duopoly model," FEP Working Papers 576, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    6. Minas Vlassis & Maria Varvataki, 2014. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Vertical Differentiation: Do Unions Affect Quality?," Working Papers 1409, University of Crete, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    vertical differentiation; workers’ skills; wage bargaining; welfare;

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • J00 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - General

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