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Structure de propriété, relation d'agence et performance financière

  • Gérard Charreaux

[eng] Ownersfflp structures, agency relatlonship and financial performance This study aims to test the effect of ownership structure and more broadly of organizational form on financial performance according to agency theory, by distinguishing between three types of firms : managerial firms, controlled firms and family-owned firms. After discussing the financial performance notion and choice of a relevant performance measure, tests have been conducted on the selected measures for a sample of french listed firms in order to verify validity of some conclusions based on american studies and to judge the relevancy of the proposed arguing. Our findings corroborate the neutrality thesis of ownership structure and of organizational form, from shareholder's point of view. On the contrary, if we adopt the firm-value maximization goal, family-owned firms obtain a higher performance. This last resuit which should confirm the convergence-of-interest hypothesis, could be explained by importance of debt-financing agency costs in this kind of firms. [fre] Structures de propriété, relation d'agence et performance financière. Ownership structures, agency relationship and financial performance Cette étude a pour objectif de tester l'incidence de la structure de propriété et plus généralement de la forme organisationnelle sur la performance financière, dans l'optique de la théorie de l'agence en distinguant trois types de sociétés : les sociétés manager/aies, les sociétés contrôlées et les sociétés familiales. Après une discussion préalable sur la notion de performance financière et le choix d'une mesure adéquate, les tests ont été conduits sur les différentes mesures sélectionnées et sur un échantillon de sociétés cotées françaises afin de vérifier la validité de certaines conclusions fondées sur des recherches effectuées aux États-Unis, puis d'apprécier la pertinence de la démarche proposée. Les conclusions obtenues corroborent la thèse de la neutralité de la structure de propriété, et plus généralement de la forme organisationnelle, lorsqu'on considère le point de vue des actionnaires. En revanche, si on adopte l'objectif de maximisation de la valeur de la firme, les sociétés familiales réalisent une performance supérieure. L'origine de ce dernier résultat qui confirmerait l'hypothèse de convergence des intérêts, pourrait se situer dans l'importance des coûts d'agence liés à l'endettement dans ce type de firme.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 42 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 521-552

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1991_num_42_3_409292
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1991.409292
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