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Le choix du type et de la maturité de la dette par les firmes françaises

  • Mehdi Nekhili

    ()

    (Université de Bourgogne)

Cet article met en évidence les avantages que présente l'intermédiation financière pour contrôler les dirigeants. Après avoir passé en revue les développements récents de la théorie de l'intermédiation financière, un modèle est appliqué à 84 firmes françaises afin de comprendre leur comportement en matière d'endettement. Les résultats montrent que la préférence pour la dette bancaire n'est pas absolue. Le choix du financement et de la maturité dépendent de la nature de l'actif à financer, de l'autofinancement, de la taille, de la structure de propriété et de la performance.

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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 0990901.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Sep 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, vol.2, n°3, septembre 1999, p.179-206.
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:0990901
Note: article publié dans Finance Contrôle Stratégie, vol.2, n°3, septembre 1999, p.179-206.
Contact details of provider: Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

Order Information: Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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