IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Structure de l’actionnariat familial et performance des grands groupes coréens

  • Joon Tae Lee


    (Université de Toulouse 1)

Registered author(s):

    (VF)L’objet de cet article est d’étudier la relation entre la structure actionnariale et la performance dans le cas des grands groupes coréens, caractérisés par une structure à contrôle minoritaire. Les résultats, obtenus à partir d’un échantillon de 29 grands groupes coréens sur la période 1990-1996, indiquent que l’impact positif supposé de l’actionnariat familial sur la performance n’est confirmé que pour un certain niveau de la concentration actionnariale.(VA) The object of this article is to study the relation between the ownership structure and the performance in the case of the Korean business groups characterized by a con-trolling-minority structure. The results, obtained from a sample of 29 Korean business groups over the 1990-1996 period, indicate that the supposed positive impact of family ownership on performance is confirmed only at a certain level of ownership concentration.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

    Volume (Year): 7 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 143-166

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:7:y:2004:i:q4:p:143-166
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    Order Information: Email:

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Gérard Charreaux, 1991. "Structure de propriété, relation d'agence et performance financière," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(3), pages 521-552.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1840, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    3. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    4. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Joseph P. H. Fan & Lang, Larry H. P., 1999. "Corporate diversification in East Asia : the role of ultimate ownership and group affiliation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2089, The World Bank.
    5. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov^, Simeon & Fan, Joseph P.H. & Lang, Larry H.P., 2000. "The Costs of Group Affiliation: Evidence from East Asia," CEI Working Paper Series 2000-5, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    6. Ghemawat, Pankaj & Khanna, Tarun, 1998. "The Nature of Diversified Business Groups: A Research Design and Two Case Studies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 35-61, March.
    7. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    8. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
    9. Khanna, Tarun, 2000. "Business groups and social welfare in emerging markets: Existing evidence and unanswered questions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 748-761, May.
    10. Joh, Sung Wook, 2003. "Corporate governance and firm profitability: evidence from Korea before the economic crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 287-322, May.
    11. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:7:y:2004:i:q4:p:143-166. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gérard Charreaux)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.