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La convergence des systèmes nationaux de gouvernance: une perspective contingente

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  • Gérard Charreaux

    (LEG - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to show that the answer to the question of convergence of national systems of governance is contingent on a number of assumptions. The first assumption bears on the functions and the formal mechanisms characterizing the systems of governance. The second concerns the possibility to define a unique national system of governance for all the firms of a nation. The third focuses on the process of homogenization of national systems of governance attributed to globalization.

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Charreaux, 2009. "La convergence des systèmes nationaux de gouvernance: une perspective contingente," Post-Print hal-00435251, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00435251
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    1. Katharina Pistor & Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, 2000. "Law and Finance in Transition Economies," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(2), pages 325-368, July.
    2. Gérard Charreaux, 2008. "À la recherche du lien perdu entre caractéristiques des dirigeants et performance de la firme : gouvernance et latitude managériale," Working Papers CREGO 1080502, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    3. S. Boubaker & F. Labégorre, 2009. "Ownership and control structure of french listed firms," Post-Print hal-00803118, HAL.
    4. Gérard Charreaux, 1996. "Vers une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers CREGO 0960501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    5. Peter Wirtz, 2005. "« Meilleures pratiques » de gouvernance et création de valeur : une appréciation critique des codes de bonne conduite," ACCRA, Association francophone de comptabilité, vol. 11(1), pages 141-159.
    6. Clifford G. Holderness, 2009. "The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(4), pages 1377-1408, April.
    7. Gérard Charreaux, 2002. "L'actionnaire comme apporteur de ressources cognitives," Revue française de gestion, Lavoisier, vol. 141(5), pages 77-107.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bouras Mehdi & Gallali Mohamed Imen, 2014. "The Determinants Of Equity Based Compensation: A Bidimensional Validity Of The Agency Theory," Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance (AAMJAF), Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, vol. 10(2), pages 117-145.
    2. Bernard Laurent & Peter Wirtz, 2010. "Valeurs du dirigeant, conception de la propriété et modèle de gouvernance : une illustration à travers le cas du groupe Auchan," Working Papers CREGO 1100703, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.

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    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other

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