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Valeurs du dirigeant, conception de la propriété et modèle de gouvernance : une illustration à travers le cas du groupe Auchan

  • Bernard Laurent

    (EM Lyon)

  • Peter Wirtz

    ()

    (Université de Lyon 2 - COACTIS)

Cet article s’interroge, au-delà des déterminants économiques et institutionnels, sur le rôle des valeurs des dirigeants dans la détermination de la structure de propriété et des mécanismes de gouvernance d’entreprise. Nous partons du postulat central de la théorie des échelons supérieurs, selon lequel l’entreprise serait le reflet de l’expérience et de la base de valeurs de ses dirigeants, pour expliquer l’existence et la persistance d’arrangements particuliers, voire atypiques (en référence au modèle dominant), en matière de gouvernance d’entreprise. Le groupe Auchan représente un tel cas atypique et fournit une illustration concrète de l’impact d’un système de valeurs particulier ainsi que de ses implications pour la conception de la propriété sur le modèle de gouvernance. Il apparaît notamment que, dans le cas d’Auchan, l’évolution de la structure de propriété n’est pas d’abord dictée par l’impératif d’une minimisation des risques de spoliation des droits des actionnaires, mais découle directement d’un système de valeurs qui considère que la propriété d’une entreprise et l’exercice des droits y afférents impliquent une responsabilité vis-à-vis des personnes qui la composent, et cela de façon durable.

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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 1100703.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2010
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Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1100703
Contact details of provider: Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

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