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Contribution Delalande et transitions sur le marché du travail

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  • Luc Behaghel
  • Bruno Crépon
  • Béatrice Sédillot

Abstract

[spa] Contribución Delalande y transiciones en el mercado laboral . . Instaurada en 1987, la contribución Delalande es una tasa que trata de evitar que las empresas despidan a los trabajadores de más de 50 años. Semejante dispositivo puede con todo tener unos efectos perversos. Este puede en particular hacer que las empresas dejen de contratar a trabajadores viejos para no correr el riesgo de tener que pagar después esa tasa. Se evalúan aquí de manera empírica los diferentes efectos sobre las contrataciones y sobre los despidos de dicha tasa, sacando partido de las numerosas modificaciones que ya sufrió ese dispositivo. El efecto de restricción de las contrataciones de los trabajadores viejos se estudia a partir de un cambio acaecido en 1992 que exonera del dispositivo a los trabajadores contratados después de los cincuenta años. Conforme con unas predicciones teóricas, se observa pues una mejora de las posibilidades de regreso al empleo de los desempleados de más de cincuenta años en comparación con los desempleados de menos de 50 años. No parece que esta evolución se deba a otros cambios concomitantes tales como la introducción de los contratos ayudados dedicados en especial a aquellos parados de más de 50 años. El efecto sobre los despidos es en cambio más tenue o al menos más difícil de poner en evidencia: las decisiones de despido de las empresas serían poco sensibles a las fuertes variaciones del baremo de la contribución Delalande. [eng] The Delalande Contribution and Transitions on the Labour Market . . The Delalande tax was introduced in 1987 to discourage companies from laying off workers over 50 years old. However, there are adverse effects to such a system. Among other things, it can encourage firms to avoid hiring older workers so as not to risk being liable for this tax at a later date. This paper empirically evaluates the different effects on hirings and firings, drawing on the many changes made to the mechanism. The effect of cutting back on hiring older workers is studied on the basis of a change in 1992, which made workers hired after the age of 50 exempt from the scheme. In keeping with the theoretical predictions, we observe an improvement in the chances of returning to work for jobseekers over 50 compared with jobseekers under 50. This development does not appear to be due to other attendant changes such as the introduction of government-subsidised contracts for jobseekers over 50. Yet redundancies have a lesser, or at least less discernable, effect: firms’ redundancy decisions are thought to be not very sensitive to the sharp variations in the Delalande contribution scale. [fre] Contribution Delalande et transitions sur le marché du travail . . Instaurée en 1987, la contribution Delalande est une taxe qui vise à dissuader les entreprises de licencier des travailleurs de plus de 50 ans. Un tel dispositif peut néanmoins avoir des effets pervers. Il peut inciter, en particulier, les entreprises à éviter l’embauche de travailleurs âgés, afin de ne pas risquer d’être redevables ultérieurement de cette taxe. Les différents effets sur les embauches et les licenciements sont évalués ici empiriquement, en tirant parti des nombreuses modifications que le dispositif a connues. L’effet de restriction des embauches de travailleurs âgés est étudié à partir d’un changement, intervenu en 1992, qui exonère du dispositif les travailleurs recrutés après 50 ans. Conformément aux prédictions théoriques, on observe alors une amélioration des chances de retour à l’emploi des chômeurs de plus de 50 ans par rapport aux chômeurs de moins de 50 ans. Cette évolution ne semble pas due à d’autres changements concomitants, comme l’introduction de contrats aidés ciblés particulièrement sur les chômeurs de plus de 50 ans. L’effet sur les licenciements est, en revanche, plus faible, ou du moins difficile à mettre en évidence: les décisions de licenciement des entreprises seraient peu sensibles aux fortes variations du barème de la contribution Delalande. [ger] Delalande-Abgabe und Übergänge auf dem Arbeitsmarkt . . Die 1987 eingeführte Delalande-Steuer ist eine Abgabe, die die Unternehmen davon abhalten soll, Arbeitnehmer von über 50 Jahren zu entlassen. Ein solches System kann aber auch kontraproduktiv sein. Denn es kann insbesondere dazu führen, dass die Unternehmen keine älteren Arbeitnehmer einstellen, um später diese Abgabe nicht zahlen zu müssen. In diesem Artikel werden die verschiedenen Effekte auf die Einstellungen und Entlassungen empirisch analysiert, wobei den zahlreichen Änderungen, die diese Maßnahme erfahren hat, Rechnung getragen wird. Es wird untersucht, welche Auswirkungen auf die Beschränkung der Einstellung älterer Arbeitnehmer eine Änderung von 1992 hat, der zufolge Arbeitnehmer, die bei ihrer Einstellung über 50 Jahre alt sind, nicht unter diese Maßnahme fallen. Gemäß den theoretischen Vorhersagen lässt sich dann feststellen, dass sich die Chancen eines über 50-jährigen Arbeitslosen im Vergleich zu einem unter 50-jährigen Arbeitslosen, wieder eine Beschäftigung zu finden, verbessern. Diese Entwicklung ist •so scheint es •nicht auf andere gleichzeitig vorgenommene Änderungen zurückzuführen, wie beispielsweise die Einführung speziell geförderter Arbeitsverträge insbesondere für Arbeitslose von über 50 Jahren. Dagegen ist der Effekt auf die Entlassungen geringer oder zumindest schwerer zu ermitteln: demnach hätten starke Schwankungen der Sätze der Delalande-Abgabe nur wenig Einfluss auf die Entscheidungen der Unternehmen, Arbeitnehmer zu entlassen.

Suggested Citation

  • Luc Behaghel & Bruno Crépon & Béatrice Sédillot, 2004. "Contribution Delalande et transitions sur le marché du travail," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 372(1), pages 61-88.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_2004_num_372_1_7267
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.2004.7267
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sandrine Levasseur, 2008. "Progrès technologique et employabilité des seniors," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(3), pages 155-184.
    2. International Monetary Fund, 2005. "France; Selected Issues," IMF Staff Country Reports 05/397, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Hairault, Jean-Olivier & Langot, François & Sopraseuth, Thepthida, 2005. "Les effets à rebours de l'âge de la retraite sur le taux d'emploi des seniors," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 0513, CEPREMAP.
    4. Behaghel, Luc & Crépon, Bruno & Sédillot, Béatrice, 2008. "The perverse effects of partial employment protection reform: The case of French older workers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 696-721, April.
    5. Werner Eichhorst & Tito Boeri & An De Coen & Vincenzo Galasso & Michael Kendzia & Nadia Steiber, 2014. "How to combine the entry of young people in the labour market with the retention of older workers?," IZA Journal of European Labor Studies, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 3(1), pages 1-23, December.
    6. Jianping Zhou, 2006. "Reforming Employment Protection Legislation in France," IMF Working Papers 06/108, International Monetary Fund.
    7. David Neumark & Joanne Song & Patrick Button, 2015. "Does Protecting Older Workers from Discrimination Make It Harder to Get Hired? Revised with Additional Analysis of SIPP Data and Appendix of Disability Laws," Working Papers wp315, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
    8. Patrick Aubert, 2005. "Les salaires des seniors sont-ils un obstacle à leur emploi ?," Post-Print hal-01429390, HAL.
    9. Eichhorst, Werner & Boeri, Tito & Braga, Michela & De Coen, An & Galasso, Vincenzo & Gerard, Maarten & Kendzia, Michael J. & Mayrhuber, Christine & Pedersen, Jakob Louis & Schmidl, Ricarda & Steiber, , 2013. "Report No. 53: Combining the Entry of Young People in the Labour Market with the Retention of Older Workers," IZA Research Reports 53, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    10. Holger Schmieding & Daniela Schwarzer & Sebastian Wanke & Eric Thode, 2007. "Frankreich nach der Wahl: Bringt die Regierung Sarkozy Frankreich wieder auf Wachstumskurs?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 60(11), pages 03-15, June.
    11. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6144 is not listed on IDEAS

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